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DYING FOR A SOLUTION: INCIDENTAL TAKING UNDER
THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT
ANDREW G. OGDEN*
ABSTRACT
The almost century-old Migratory Bird Treaty Act (“MBTA”) is
straining to fulfill its statutory purpose of protecting migratory birds from
the changing and growing threats of a modern industrial society. With ap-
proximately 600 million bird deaths per year from a host of anthropogenic
activities and infrastructure, including alternative energy projects, oil and
gas development, antennas, power lines and buildings, migratory bird pop-
ulations are under stress that will increase significantly in the near future
from a momentous growth in wind energy activity.
Since the 1970s, the Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) has at-
tempted to reconcile the MBTA’s conservation policy and strict liability
taking prohibition, with the reality of growing bird deaths from taking
incidental to industrial and other activities, and the lack of a broadly ap-
plicable program to permit incidental taking. To finesse a solution to this
conundrum, the FWS has used its prosecutorial discretion to motivate
compliance with various sets of voluntary conservation guidelines for cer-
tain industries, including wind energy, to reduce incidental taking and
withhold prosecution of a cooperating party. The result has been the un-
even enforcement of the MBTA’s prohibitions, legal uncertainty for poten-
tial violators, lack of universal compliance with the voluntary guidelines,
and steadily escalating bird deaths.
The goal of this Article is to encourage a meaningful dialogue that
addresses the problem of rapidly growing anthropogenic threats to mi-
gratory birds protected by the MBTA. Specifically, how can existing law,
policy, and practice be reshaped to provide for greater conservation of pro-
tected avian species while accommodating anthropogenic activities that
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kill birds, but are a vital part of our modern industrial society? Using wind
energy development as a unique opportunity to formulate and implement
a widely applicable solution to this problem, this Article explores the back-
ground, issues, and possible solutions to this question in three parts.
In the Introduction, this Article examines the history of the MBTA,
and the past and present anthropogenic threats to migratory birds, specifi-
cally including the growing hazard from wind energy development. Part I
of this Article reviews the relevant statutory, judicial, and regulatory au-
thority establishing the applicability of the MBTA to incidental taking.
Part II discusses the failure of current FWS enforcement practice to ade-
quately and consistently prosecute violations for incidental taking, and to
provide for the long-term conservation of MBTA-protected species by im-
posing mandatory provisions to mitigate incidental taking from various
activities including wind energy projects. In Part III, this Article proposes
a broadly applicable program to permit incidental taking under the MBTA,
authorized by regulation and implemented through industry or activity-
specific guidelines starting with the wind energy industry. The Article
concludes by exploring future implementation of the incidental take permit
program to other activities and infrastructure that cause incidental taking.
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INTRODUCTION
It may be surprising that one of the nation’s first wildlife laws, the
almost century-old Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 (“MBTA”),1 is one
that arguably continues to be the most unsettled of all the federal statutes
that protect and regulate wildlife.2 Deceptively succinct, under the MBTA
1 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–711 (2006).
2 The Lacey Act of 1900, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3378, is commonly recognized as the nation’s
first wildlife conservation statute with a national scope. Robert S. Anderson, The Lacey
Act: America’s Premier Weapon in the Fight Against Unlawful Wildlife Trafficking, 16 PUB.
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the Department of the Interior (“DOI”), through the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (“FWS”), administers a program that currently protects 1026 spe-
cies of migratory birds that spend all or part of their lives in the United
States, including iconic species such as the Sand Hill Crane, Northern
Gannet, and Trumpeter Swan, as well as a host of ducks, warblers, plovers,
gulls, shearwaters, chickadees, hummingbirds, and other species.3
History of the MBTA. The MBTA was enacted to implement a
1916 treaty with Great Britain,4 acting on behalf of its then-province
Canada, for the protection of birds that migrate between the two coun-
tries.5 The MBTA was amended to implement later treaties between the
United States and Mexico,6 Japan,7 and the former Soviet Union (now
Russia).8 The MBTA protects species that are native to the United States
or its territories and belong to a family, group, or species covered by one
of the four migratory bird conventions.9
LAND L. REV. 27, 29 (1995). The MBTA replaced the Weeks-McLean Migratory Bird Act,
enacted in 1913, which was the first federal law to regulate the shooting of migratory birds.
A Guide to the Laws and Treaties of the United States for Protecting Migratory Birds, U.S.
FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., available at http://www.fws.gov/Migratorybirds/RegulationsPolicies
/treatlaw.html. The Weeks-McLean Act was declared unconstitutional by two federal dis-
trict courts and upheld by a third, but an appeal before the Supreme Court was dismissed
as moot following the ratification of the Migratory Bird Treaty of 1916 and the enactment
of the MBTA in 1918. DALE D. GOBLE & ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAW CASES AND
MATERIALS 459–60 (2010).
3 See 50 C.F.R. § 10.13 (2013); Birds Protected by the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, U.S. FISH
& WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/migratorybirds/RegulationsPolicies/mbta/mbtandx
.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2013); 79 Fed. Reg. 65843 (Nov. 1, 2013), https://www.federalregis
trar.gov/articles/2013/11/01/2013-26061/general-provisions-revised-list-of-migratory-birds.
4 Convention Between the United States and Great Britain for the Protection of Migratory
Birds, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702.
5 Digest of Federal Resource Laws of Interest to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service:
Treaties List, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/laws/lawsdigest/treaty
.html #MIGBIRDCAN (last visited Dec. 11, 2013).
6 Convention between the United States of America and Mexico for the Protection of
Migratory Birds and Game Mammals, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 7, 1936, 50 Stat. 1311. The MBTA
was amended on June 20, 1936 to implement the treaty. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2006).
7 Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of Japan for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of Extinction, and Their
Environment, U.S.-Japan, Mar. 4, 1972, 25.3 U.S.T. 3329. The MBTA was amended on
June 1, 1975 to implement the treaty. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2006).
8 Convention Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics Concerning the Conservation of Migratory Birds and Their Environment, U.S.-
U.S.S.R., Nov. 26, 1976, 29.4 U.S.T. 4674. The MBTA was amended on November 8, 1978
to implement the treaty. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2006).
9 50 C.F.R. § 10.13 (2013). Non-native human-introduced species that are covered by one
or more of the conventions implemented by the MBTA are not protected, nor are species
that are native but not covered by any of the four conventions. See John L. Trapp, Bird
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The foundations of the 1916 Convention and the enabling MBTA
were laid during the period of excessive exploitation of the nation’s game
and non-game birds during the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies.10 Fueled by the demand of a rapidly urbanizing United States, the
widespread market hunting of waterfowl along the Eastern Seaboard was
unchecked by regulations or any tinge of a conservation ethic, and was lim-
ited only by the skill of the market hunter, his supply of powder and shot,
and the seasonable availability of waterfowl.11 New technology speeded the
commercial exploitation of seemingly inexhaustible populations of game
birds such as the Passenger Pigeon. The westward extension of the rail-
roads ferried hunters to distant nestings, refrigerated railcars preserved
shipments of game to urban markets, and the telegraph quickly spread
news to “pigeon netters” of where nestings of millions of adult birds and un-
fledged nestlings covering hundreds of square miles were located and avail-
able for killing.12 Compounding market-driven exploitation was the demand
Species of the United States and its Territories and Their Protection Under the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (Mar. 8, 2005), http://web.archive.org/web
/20060902074933/http://www.fws.gov/migratorybirds/issues/nonnative/MBTA-Protected
&NonprotectedSpecies.htm.
10 See George Cameron Coggins & Sebastian T. Patti, The Resurrection and Expansion
of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 50 U. COLO. L. REV. 165, 167–69 (1979). See generally
PETER MATTHIESSEN, WILDLIFE IN AMERICA 157–82 (1987); CARL SAFINA, THE VIEW FROM
LAZY POINT—A NATURAL YEAR IN AN UNNATURAL WORLD 184–87 (2011).
11 GOBLE & FREYFOGLE, supra note 2, at 769 (quoting an excerpt from GUY A. BALDASSARRE
& ERIC G. BOLEN, WATERFOWL ECOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT 517–20 (1994)).
12 Id. at 28. One such nesting in 1878 at Petoskey, Michigan, was estimated to cover 750
square miles and include 136,000,000 birds. The award-winning author, Peter Matthiessen,
described the killing that took place at this nesting as follows:
[T]he predators, white, Indian, and animal, swarmed down upon the
roosts from every direction. The recent invention of the telegraph had
speeded the glad news into all the adjoining states, and there were lit-
erally thousands of hunter and trappers on hand, armed variously with
net, fire, and shot, as well as with an assortment of homemade contriv-
ances designed to perform the most heroic destruction in the shortest
possible time. The area was laid waste. Hundred of thousands, indeed
millions, of dead birds were shipped out at a wholesale price of fifteen
to twenty-five cents a dozen, on the cars of the same railroads which, by
opening the great eastern markets, were accommodating the exit of the
bison. The season, commencing in April, was profitable for only a month,
and by June the markets were glutted, the pigeons were scattered, and
the hunters had largely departed, leaving behind a rancid wasteland of
ground white with guano, of broken trees, nests, eggs, and blue-feathered,
fly-blown forms too shattered to ship, of starving squabs, of maggots and
silent fur-clawed and beaked prowlers.
MATTHIESSEN, supra note 10, at 159–60.
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precipitated by ladies’ fashion, which dictated that the well-dressed woman
of the gilded age should wear elegant hats, gowns, capes, and parasols
adorned with ornamental feathers from such exotic species as the roseate
spoonbill, great white heron, and snowy egret.13
The scope of the slaughter led to the founding of the Audubon
Society in 188614 by George Bird Grinnell,15 and compelled conservationists
such as Frank Chapman, the leading ornithologist in America, to cham-
pion the enactment of protective measures by the federal and state gov-
ernments.16 “[T]he framers of the MBTA were determined to put an end to
the commercial trade in birds and their feathers that, by the early years
of the twentieth century, had wreaked havoc on the populations of many
native bird species.”17 The MBTA, as eventually enacted, “decreed that all
migratory birds and their parts (including eggs, nests, and feathers) were
fully protected” from exploitation.18
The MBTA has been remarkably successful in the abatement of
over-exploitation from activities such as hunting and poaching.19 For ex-
ample, the Snowy Egret, once hunted extensively for its plumage, has re-
bounded due to the protections of the MBTA from dangerously low levels
to an estimated current population of over 1.3 million individuals in the
continental United States.20 However, the numerous populations of bird
species in the United States now face a far broader range of threats than
posed by the market hunters and plumers of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, most of which did not exist in that earlier era.21
Modern Threats to Birds. Today, all species of birds are far more
likely to be killed by anthropogenic threats than the estimated fifteen
13 See DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE WILDERNESS WARRIOR: THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE
CRUSADE FOR AMERICA 9–12 (2009).
14 Jennifer Price, Hats Off to Audubon, AUDUBON MAG. (Dec. 2004), http://archive.audubon
magazine.org/features0412/hats.html.
15 See BRINKLEY, supra note 13.
16 Id. at 10–11.
17 A Guide to the Laws and Treaties of the United States for Protecting Migratory Birds, U.S.
FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/migratorybirds/RegulationsPolicies/treatlaw
.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2013).
18 Id.
19 See Conrad A. Fjetland, Possibilities for Expansion of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act for
the Protection of Migratory Birds, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 47, 48 (2000).
20 Snowy Egret, NAT’L AUDUBON SOC’Y, http://birds.audubon.org/species/snoegr (follow
“Conservation Status” tab) (last visited Dec. 11, 2013).
21 See Fjetland, supra note 19, at 48–49; Umair Irfan, Bats and Birds Face Serious Threats
From Growth of Wind Energy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/cwire
/2011/08/08/08climatewire-bats-and-birds-face-serious-threats-from-gro-10511.html.
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million birds taken annually by hunters.22 In 2002, the FWS Migratory
Bird Mortality Fact Sheet identified the leading causes and estimated
levels of mortality for the 10 to 20 billion birds that breed in the United
States23 (other than from habitat loss or degradation) to be collisions with
building windows (estimated 97 to 976 million bird deaths per year), com-
munications towers (4 to 5 million), high tension transmission and power
lines (up to 174 million), electrocutions (tens of thousands), impacts with
vehicles (60 million or more), pesticide poisoning (72 million), and wind
turbine rotors (33,000).24
Recent research has more precisely estimated the levels of mor-
tality in the United States from some of these anthropogenic causes.25
Scientific studies have concluded that strikes with building windows cause
100 million to 1 billion bird deaths per year,26 collisions with communica-
tions towers kill approximately 6.6 million birds per year,27 and oil field
production “skim pits” and wastewater disposal facilities kill 500,000 to
1 million birds annually.28 Another study found that a bird is far more
likely to be killed by a free-ranging domestic or feral house cat than any
other “anthropogenic” threat.29 Finally, a non-scientific investigation found
22 David Sibley, Causes of Bird Mortality, SIBLEY GUIDES (Jan. 15, 2010), http://www.sibley
guides.com/conservation/causes-of-bird-mortality (last updated Nov. 18, 2010).
23 Migratory Bird Mortality: Many Human-Caused Threats Afflict our Bird Populations,
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (Jan. 2002) [hereinafter Migratory Bird Mortality], available
at http://www.fws.gov/birds/Mortality-Fact-Sheet.pdf; John L. Trapp, How Many Birds
Are There?, BIRDS ETCETERA (July 23, 2002, 9:19 PM), http://birdstuff.blogspot.com/2002
/07/how-many-birds-are-there.html.
24 Migratory Bird Mortality, supra note 23.
25 See, e.g., Sibley, supra note 22.
26 Daniel Klem, Jr., Avian Mortality at Windows: The Second Largest Human Source of
Bird Mortality on Earth, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH INT’L PARTNERS IN FLIGHT CONF.:
TUNDRA TO TROPICS 244, 246 (2009), available at http://training.fws.gov/CSP/Resources/mig
_birds/handouts/avian_mortality_at_windows.pdf.
27 Travis Longcore et al., An Estimate of Avian Mortality at Communication Towers in the
United States and Canada, PLOS ONE, at 12 (Apr. 2012), available at http://www.plosone
.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0034025.
28 Migratory Bird Mortality in Oilfield Wastewater Disposal Facilities, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE
SERV. (May 2009), available at http://www.fws.gov/mountain-prairie/contaminants/docu
ments/COWDFBirdMortality.pdf.
29 Scott R. Loss et al., The Impact of Free-Ranging Domestic Cats on Wildlife of the United
States, NATURE COMM. Jan. 29, 2013, at 1, available at http://www.abcbirds.org/abcprograms
/policy/cats/pdf/Loss_et_al_2013.pdf. Based on a systematic review of studies that estimated
predation rates of owned and unowned cats, the authors of this study estimated that free-
ranging house cats kill 1.4–3.7 billion birds annually across the contiguous United States
(excluding Alaska and Hawaii). Unowned cats, as opposed to owned pets, cause the
majority (~69%) of this mortality. The authors’ findings suggest that free-ranging cats
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that open PVC pipes used to mark many of the 3.4 million mining claims,
mainly on federal public lands in the twelve western states, pose a signifi-
cant risk to birds that become entrapped in their narrow smooth interiors.30
This seemingly innocuous threat potentially kills as many as 10 to 20 mil-
lion birds per year.31
The Special Case of Wind Energy. Wind energy development and all
that it entails—turbines with rotors the size of airliner wings, high-tension
power transmission lines, buildings, roads, fences and other structures—
is possibly the largest influx of new infrastructure on a national scale since
the construction of the interstate highway system.32 Concern has been
growing about bird deaths from the development and operation of wind
energy projects because studies and environmental reviews indicate that
these projects are a rapidly growing source of avian mortality.33 In 2009,
the FWS estimated that 440,000 birds were killed annually by wind tur-
bines located in the United States.34 A more recent analysis of available
fatality monitoring reports from wind energy projects throughout North
America estimated there were 573,000 bird deaths in 2012.35 In 2013 the
FWS forecast that bird deaths from wind energy operations will exceed
one million by 2030.36 Bird deaths at wind energy projects impact many
species that are protected by the MBTA.37
cause substantially greater wildlife mortality than previously thought and are likely the
single greatest source of anthropogenic mortality for birds in the United States. Id. at 2.
30 Rachel Nuwer, Mine Markers Threaten Birds Out West, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2012,
7:39 AM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/26/a-haven-that-proves-deadly-for-birds.
31 Id.
32 See, e.g., Big Wind Turbines Require Infrastructure Upgrades, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY
LAB., http://www.nrel.gov/continuum/utility_scale/big_wind.cfm (last updated Sept. 26, 2012).
33 See, e.g., Robin Webster & Freya Roberts, Bird Death and Wind Turbines: A Look at the
Evidence, THE CARBON BRIEF (Apr. 10, 2013, 4:30 PM), http://www.carbonbrief.org/blog
/2013/04/wind-farms-and-birds.
34 Albert M. Manville, II, Towers, Turbines, Power Lines, and Buildings—Steps Being Taken
by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to Avoid or Minimize Take of Migratory Birds at These
Structures, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH INT’L PARTNERS IN FLIGHT CONF.: TUNDRA TO
TROPICS 262, 268 (2008), available at http://www.pwrc.usgs.gov/pif/pubs/McAllenProc/articles
/PIF09_Anthropogenic%20Impacts/Manville_PIF09.pdf.
35 K. Shawn Smallwood, Comparing Bird and Bat Fatality-Rate Estimates Among North
American Wind-Energy Projects, 37 WILDLIFE SOC’Y BULL. Mar. 2013, at 19, 26 (this esti-
mate included 83,000 raptor fatalities).
36 Wind Power Could Kill Millions of Birds Per Year by 2030, AM. BIRD CONSERVANCY
(Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.abcbirds.org/newsandreports/releases/110202.html.
37 See, e.g., Thomas H. Kunz et al., Assessing Impacts of Wind-Energy Development on
Nocturnally Active Birds and Bats: A Guidance Document, 71 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 2449,
2450 (2007), available at http://www.nationalwind.org/assets/publications/Nocturnal_MM
_Final-JWM.pdf.
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Birds are killed by both the direct and indirect impacts of wind
energy generation activities.38 Direct impacts include deaths from colli-
sions with rotating turbine blades and from “barotraumas,” the apparent
effect of sudden changes in air pressure from wind wake turbulence and
blade tip vortices that results in collapsed lungs, often with no sign of blunt
force trauma.39 Collisions with towers, nacelles, meteorological tower guy
wires, power lines, and the associated infrastructures can also kill birds,
and “bird unfriendly” wiring can cause death by electrocution.40 Significant
indirect impacts include habitat fragmentation, the “barrier effect,” and
disturbance and disruption that prevent breeding and alter behavior.41
Habitat fragmentation is of particular concern for grassland songbirds and
“prairie grouse” species.42 Noise from turbine blades can also adversely
affect habitat by masking birds’ communication and other biologically sig-
nificant sounds, as well as from disturbance and acoustical fragmentation.43
Finally, the cumulative effects of the various indirect impacts, and of the
direct and indirect effects to normal mortality, will all increase as the wind
industry expands.44
Although this Article proposes a broadly applicable solution to the
problem of incidental taking by many anthropogenic threats, it focuses on
the development and operation of wind energy projects for two reasons.
First, it is the official policy of the Obama administration that wind energy
is a key component of developing a mix of renewable energy generation
sources, especially on public lands and certain offshore locations.45 The
commitment to this policy was first evidenced by the growth of installed
wind power capacity from 20,000 MW in 2008 to over 60,000 MW at the
end of 2012.46 Further, a 2008 Department of Energy report calls for the
38 See Allan L. Drewitt & Rowena H. W. Langston, Assessing the Impacts of Wind Farms
on Birds, 148 IBIS 29, 30–34 (2006).
39 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., DRAFT LAND-BASED WIND ENERGY GUIDELINES 9 (Feb.
2011), available at http://www.fws.gov/windenergy/docs/Final_Wind_Energy_Guidelines
_2_8_11_CLEAN.pdf, replaced by U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FINAL LAND-BASED WIND
ENERGY GUIDELINES at 8 (Mar. 2012) [hereinafter FINAL WIND ENERGY GUIDELINES],
available at http://www.fws.gov/windenergy/docs/WEG_final.pdf (emphasis added).
40 Manville, supra note 34, at 269.
41 Id.; FINAL WIND ENERGY GUIDELINES, supra note 39, at 9–12.
42 Manville, supra note 34, at 269–70.
43 FINAL WIND ENERGY GUIDELINES, supra note 39, at 11.
44 Manville, supra note 34, at 269–70.
45 See THE WHITE HOUSE, BLUEPRINT FOR A SECURE ENERGY FUTURE 32–36 (Mar. 30,
2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/blueprint_secure_energy
_future.pdf.
46 See AWEA U.S. Wind Industry Annual Market Report Year Ending 2012 Executive
Summary, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N (2013), available at http://awea.files.cms-plus.com
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United States to source twenty percent of domestic electricity from wind
power by 2030.47 The report estimates that achieving this goal will require
a total of 305 gigawatts (305,000 MW) of installed land-based and offshore
wind power capacity by 2030,48 a fivefold increase from current capacity.
Wind energy growth is also being driven by the adoption of renewable en-
ergy portfolio standards by thirty states and the District of Columbia, and
renewable energy goals from an additional seven states.49
Second, even though the number of bird deaths from wind energy
activities is currently small in comparison to other anthropogenic causes
of mortality, as a new national industry it presents a unique opportunity
to formulate and implement a system of planning, approval, oversight, and
enforcement.50 This system could, during the developmental phase of the
wind industry and associated infrastructure, both improve the conservation
of MBTA-protected species and at the same time provide legal certainty
regarding liability for the inevitable incidental taking.51 Once refined, such
a system could be adapted and used to minimize incidental taking and pro-
vide legal certainty from other activities and infrastructure, such as oil and
gas extraction, electricity transmission, communications and other towers,
and window glass in buildings.52
The Issue and Outline of this Article. The available data for all
sources of avian mortality, including wind energy activities, supports the
conclusion that the avian resources of the United States currently suffer
from an anthropogenic predation of approximately 600 million birds per
year, or approximately 3% to 6% of the annual breeding population.53 This
/images/AWEA_USWindIndustryAnnualMarketReport2012_ExecutiveSummary(2).pdf.
47 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 20% WIND ENERGY BY 2030: INCREASING WIND
ENERGY’S CONTRIBUTION TO U.S. ELECTRICITY SUPPLY 1–21 (2008), available at http://
www.nrel.gov/docs/fy08osti/41869.pdf.
48 Id. at 7, 10.
49 Most States Have Renewable Portfolio Standards, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 3,
2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4850.
50 See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Harmonizing Commercial Wind Power and the Endangered Species
Act Through Administrative Reform, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1769, 1770–76 (2012).
51 The discussion of how to adapt other existing federal wildlife protection laws to the reality
of a rapidly developing wind energy industry is also taking place. See, e.g., id. at 1796.
52 See id. at 1794, 1798–99.
53 Calculated using a consensus estimate of a breeding population of between 10–20 bil-
lion birds in the U.S. (see supra note 23), and the averages of reliable mortality estimates
for the major anthropogenic causes of avian mortality discussed above (see supra notes
24–31) totaling approximately 600 million bird deaths per year, excluding predation from
domestic and feral cats. This estimate also does not include deaths from significant one-time
natural and man-caused events. For example, a large oil spill such as the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon accident can cause significant mortality from both immediate and long-term
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significant level of mortality will increase from the anticipated growth of
each of the anthropogenic activities that cause bird deaths as well as the
cumulative effects of all activities on avian populations.54
The United States has a long-standing national interest in protect-
ing and conserving migratory birds.55 Given this well-established public
policy and the significant bird mortalities caused by anthropogenic activi-
ties, how can existing law, policy, and practice be reshaped to provide for
greater protection and conservation of protected avian species while accom-
modating those anthropogenic activities that are a vital part of our modern
industrial society but that also cause bird deaths? With specific regard to
wind energy activities, how can the federal policy of increasing wind energy
generation capacity fivefold by 2030 be achieved without compromising
the policy and law that protects migratory birds?
This Article explores and discusses the significant legal, policy and
practical issues raised by these questions in three parts:
In Part I, this Article reviews the legal underpinnings, statutory
provisions, and judicial interpretations of the MBTA to determine whether
it prohibits “incidental taking” from conduct that is not intended to harm
protected species. The Article concludes that the weight and trend of judi-
cial authority hold that incidental takings are, within certain parameters,
a violation of the MBTA.
In Part II, this Article explores enforcement of the MBTA for inci-
dental taking, and finds that the FWS’s current “carrot and stick” practice
of incentivizing compliance with non-regulatory “guidelines” intended to
mitigate incidental taking with vague assurances of prosecutorial discre-
tion results in an uneven and inconsistent enforcement of the law. This
Article questions whether the enforcement practice itself violates several
provisions of administrative and environmental law, and concludes that
such practice is a failure on two counts: first, it fails to adequately enforce
the MBTA in a consistent manner by not prosecuting numerous viola-
tions for incidental taking. Second, it fails to provide for the long-term
impacts to migratory birds that may affect ecosystems far removed from the area directly
affected by the spill. See, e.g., Jessica R. Henkel et al., Large-Scale Impacts of the Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill: Can Local Disturbance Affect Distant Ecosystems Through Migratory
Shorebirds?, 62 BIOSCIENCE 676, 676–85 (July 2012), available at http://tulane.edu/news
/newwave/upload/bio201262711_Forum_Henkel.pdf.
54 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-906, WIND POWER: IMPACTS ON WILDLIFE
AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITIES FOR REGULATING DEVELOPMENT AND PROTECTING
WILDLIFE, 43 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05906.pdf.
55 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920) (“Here a national interest of very nearly
the first magnitude is involved.”); United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 908 (2d Cir.
1978) (“Congress recognized the important public policy behind protecting migratory birds.”).
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conservation of protected species by allowing the development and opera-
tion of activities in ways that increase incidental taking instead of imple-
menting mandatory measures to help mitigate incidental taking at the
project, landscape and population scales.
In Part III, recognizing that some level of incidental taking of
MBTA-protected species from anthropogenic threats is inevitable, this
Article discusses possible judicial, legislative, and agency actions to address
the problems of uneven and inadequate enforcement of the MBTA regard-
ing incidental taking from anthropogenic causes, notably wind energy
development. After reviewing other incidental take permit programs, the
Article concludes that a comprehensive incidental take permitting program
implemented by regulation under the MBTA would best fulfill the dual
policies of avian protection and wind energy development. The Article sug-
gests certain provisions for the proposed regulation and industry-specific
guidelines, and discusses the future application of the permit program
to other activities and infrastructure that cause significant levels of bird
deaths to mitigate such incidental taking.
Finally, before proceeding further, because the term “incidental
taking” is not defined in the MBTA, it is important to establish a working
definition for the purposes of this Article. Therefore, as used in this Article,
the term “incidental taking” (or “incidental take” or “incidental takes,” as
the context requires) means “any taking [as defined in 50 C.F.R. § 10.12,56]
if such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of
an otherwise lawful activity.”57 This definition is based on the definition
of “incidental taking” under the FWS’s regulations58 for the Endangered
Species Act (“ESA”),59 but with a narrower definition of “taking” than pro-
vided in the ESA.60
I. BACKGROUND, STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS, AND
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
A. The Migratory Bird Conventions
In 1916, the United States entered into the treaty with Great
Britain on behalf of Canada to save migratory birds protected by the
56 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (2013) (“Take means to pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture,
or collect, or attempt to pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect.”).
57 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2012).
58 See id. § 17.4 (“Incidental taking means any taking otherwise prohibited, if such taking
is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.”).
59 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1542 (2012).
60 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (“The term ‘take’ means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.”).
2013] DYING FOR A SOLUTION 13
treaty from “indiscriminate slaughter.”61 This 1916 treaty created a uniform
system of protection for certain species of birds that migrate between the
United States and Canada in order to assure the preservation of species.
Its provisions allow hunting of certain otherwise protected species but set
certain dates for closed seasons on migratory birds, prohibit the hunting
of insectivorous birds, and allow the killing of birds under permit when
injurious to agriculture.62
Later treaties with Mexico, Japan, and the U.S.S.R. between 1936
and 1976 are notable for the expansion of species protected and actions
both prohibited and mandated, including provisions for the conservation
of habitat and the prevention and abatement of pollution or detrimental
alteration of the environment.63
Commentators have concluded the provisions of the conventions
indicate that the treaty negotiators contemplated that the dominant pur-
pose of the treaties was the general protection of listed species. This is evi-
denced by the inclusions of regulatory provisions controlling both hunting
activities and non-hunting threats to species’ populations.64
B. The Migratory Bird Treaty Act
1. Statutory Provisions
The MBTA begins with the following expansive declaration in
Section 703(a):
Unless and except as permitted by regulations made as
hereinafter provided in this subchapter, it shall be unlaw-
ful at any time, by any means or in any manner, to pursue,
hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill,
possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter, offer to
purchase, purchase, deliver for shipment, ship, export, im-
port, cause to be shipped, exported, or imported, deliver for
transportation, transport or cause to be transported, carry
or cause to be carried, or receive for shipment, transporta-
tion, carriage, or export, any migratory bird, any part, nest,
or egg of any such bird, or any product, whether or not
61 See Convention Between the United States and Great Britain for the Protection of
Migratory Birds, supra note 4, at preamble.
62 Id. at art. II.
63 See Coggins & Patti, supra note 10, at 171–74.
64 Id. at 174.
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manufactured, which consists, or is composed in whole or
part, of any such bird or any part, nest, or egg thereof . . . .65
The MBTA is an unusual statute in two respects. First, it prohibits
all taking of protected species, and then only allows taking as permitted
by regulations promulgated by the enforcing agency.66 Second, the MBTA
articulates a strict liability standard for misdemeanor violations, which
a large majority of circuit courts have upheld.67 As stated by the Eighth
Circuit, “[i]t has been long held that under the [MBTA] it is not necessary
that the government prove that a defendant violated its provisions with
guilty knowledge or specific intent to commit the violation.”68
The penalties for a misdemeanor violation of the MBTA are found
in Section 707(a):
Except as otherwise provided in this section, any person,
association, partnership, or corporation who shall violate
any provisions of said conventions or of this subchapter, or
65 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2012).
66 GOBLE & FREYFOGLE, supra note 2, at 774; Migratory Bird Permits, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE
SERV. (Aug. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Migratory Bird Permits], available at http://www.fws.gov
/policy/724fw2.pdf. FWS regulations prohibit all non-hunting intentional taking of pro-
tected species without a permit. 50 C.F.R. § 21.11 (2012). FWS regulations regulate the
species that may be hunted, the permissible methods, places, and times for hunting, and
bag limits which are then generally enforced by state wildlife agencies. 50 C.F.R. §§ 20.1,
20.11, 20.21–20.24 (2012). Permits are available for the intentional and incidental taking of
protected species for the following activities: importation or exportation, 50 C.F.R. § 21.21
(2012); scientific banding or marking of specimens (from the U.S. Geological Survey), 50
C.F.R. § 21.22 (2012); scientific collecting, 50 C.F.R. § 21.23 (2012); taxidermy, 50 C.F.R.
§ 21.24 (2012); sale or disposal of captive-reared species, 50 C.F.R. § 21.25 (2012); Canada
goose pollution management, 50 C.F.R. § 21.26 (2012); falconry, 50 C.F.R. § 21.29 (2012);
raptor propagation, 50 C.F.R. § 21.30 (2012); rehabilitation, 50 C.F.R. § 21.31 (2012);
depredation to prevent damage to personal property, agricultural interests, and natural
resources, and for health and human safety, 50 C.F.R. § 21.41 (2012). Permits are also
available for “special purpose activities” upon a showing of “compelling justification,” and
for the use of migratory birds in educational exhibits. 50 C.F.R. § 21.27 (2012). See generally
Larry Martin Corcoran & Elinor Colbourn, Shocked, Crushed and Poisoned: Criminal
Enforcement in Non-Hunting Cases Under the Migratory Bird Treaties, 77 DENV. U. L. REV.
359, 373–76 (1999) (describing the permitted exceptions for taking protected bird species).
67 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 703(a); United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 431 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1019 (1987); Rogers v. United States, 367 F.2d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 943 (1967); United States v. Morgan, 311 F.3d 611, 616 (5th Cir. 2002);
United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 806 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Smith, 29 F.3d
270, 274 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Chandler, 753 F.2d 360, 363 (4th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Catlett, 747 F.2d 1102, 1105 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. FMC Corp.,
572 F.2d 902, 904, 907 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Wood, 437 F.2d 91 (9th Cir. 1971).
68 Rogers, 367 F.2d at 1001.
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who shall violate or fail to comply with any regulation
made pursuant to this subchapter shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined
not more than $15,000 or be imprisoned not more than six
months, or both.69
Section 707(b), which provides for felony penalties,70 requires that
the government prove a defendant knowingly acted in violation of the
MBTA.71 Incidental taking, by its nature, is an “unknowing” violation and
therefore subject to the strict liability standards of Section 703(a) and the
lesser misdemeanor penalties provided in Section 707(a).72
2. Regulations
Besides specifying permissible taking under Section 703(a), the
regulations issued by the enforcing agency provide insight into the mean-
ing of terms used in Section 703(a).73 Specifically, FWS regulations define
“migratory bird” is as follows:
Migratory bird means any bird, whatever its origin and
whether or not raised in captivity, which belongs to a spe-
cies listed in § 10.13, or which is a mutation or a hybrid of
any such species, including any part, nest, or egg of any
such bird, or any product, whether or not manufactured,
which consists, or is composed in whole or part, of any such
bird or any part, nest, or egg thereof.74
The FWS regulations define “take” as follows: “[t]ake means to pur-
sue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect.”75
3. Judicial Interpretations
Historically, criminal prosecutions under the MBTA focused on
illegal hunting, poaching, and possessing of protected birds, which were
69 16 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2012).
70 16 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2012) (providing for fines of up to $2,000 or imprisonment of up to
two years, or both).
71 United States v. Pitrone, 115 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997).
72 Id. at 5.
73 16 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2012).
74 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (2013).
75 Id.
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the initial problems addressed by the MBTA and the Conventions.76 How-
ever, in the early 1970s, the federal government began to prosecute cases
alleging violations of the MBTA for taking incidental to activities other
than hunting, poaching, and other violations specifically enumerated in
Section 703.77 In Andrus v. Allard the Supreme Court stated, “[t]he funda-
mental prohibition in the Migratory Bird Treaty Act is couched in language
as expansive as [the sweeping prohibition] employed in the Eagle Protec-
tion Act.”78 Notwithstanding its broad view of the scope of the MBTA’s
prohibitions, the Supreme Court has not been called upon to resolve the
issue of whether incidental taking violates Section 703(a) of the MBTA.79
Federal judges have struggled with the question of whether to apply
the MBTA to incidental taking and, if so applied, determining the scope
of prohibited activity.80 Because science is not a requirement for a misde-
meanor conviction under Section 703(a) of the MBTA, courts have focused
on the due process requirements for a conviction under the strict liability
standard of Section 703(a), as well as the interpretation of the terms “take”
and “kill” and the preceding phrase “by any means or in any manner.”81
In the Federal Circuit Courts there is a split of authorities, with rul-
ings in the Second and Tenth Circuits broadly establishing that incidental
taking is a violation of the MBTA,82 and the Eighth and Ninth Circuits find-
ing that incidental taking is not a violation for certain types of activities.83
a. Second and Tenth Circuits
The first appellate decision addressing the MBTA’s applicability to
incidental taking was the 1978 ruling in United States v. FMC Corp.84 In
this case, the Second Circuit upheld a conviction for the killing of migratory
76 See Corcoran & Colbourn, supra note 66, at 385–86.
77 See Coggins & Patti, supra note 10, at 183–85, for a history of early prosecutions of oil
production operators for the killing of migratory waterfowl in uncovered oil sump pits
under the MBTA.
78 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 60 (1979).
79 See Anthony B. Cavender et al., New Ruling Highlights Split on Strict Liability for
Incidental ‘Taking’ of Migratory Birds, PILLSBURY LAW, Jan. 30, 2012, at 2.
80 See United States v. Pitrone, 115 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997).
81 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2012).
82 United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 902 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Apollo
Energies Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 680 (10th Cir. 2010).
83 Newton Cnty. Wildlife Ass’n v. United States Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 115 (8th Cir.
1997); Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 303 (9th Cir. 1991).
84 Scott W. Brunner, The Prosecutor’s Vulture: Inconsistent MBTA Prosecution, Its Clash
With Wind Farms, and How to Fix It, 3 SEATTLE J. OF ENVTL. LAW 1, 14–15 (2012).
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birds where the defendant manufactured pesticides and had unknowingly
allowed lethal levels of a pesticide to accumulate in a waste water storage
pond where migratory birds landed and died of pesticide poisoning.85 In ex-
tending the scope of prohibited taking to those incidental to an industrial
activity, the court found that the defendant both engaged in the affirma-
tive act of manufacturing a highly toxic pesticide and failed to act to pre-
vent the dangerous chemical from accumulating in the pond.86 The court
reasoned that, because the defendant was engaged in an “extrahazardous”
activity, it was appropriate to impose strict liability for the killings under
the MBTA even though the defendant was unaware of the “lethal-to-birds
quality of the water in its pond.”87 Further, the Second Circuit noted that
the disciplined use of prosecutorial discretion would address the problem
of the MBTA’s possible overbroad application to killings from everyday
activities that “would offend reason and common sense.”88
The most recent decision on the issue, United States v. Apollo
Energies, is also the strongest authority in support of the proposition that
Section 703(a) applies to incidental taking.89 In Apollo Energies, the Tenth
Circuit upheld the convictions of two oil and gas producers, Apollo Energies
and Walker (doing business as Red Cedar Oil), for the deaths of migratory
birds caught in the exhaust pipes of oil production equipment known as
“heater-treaters.”90 On appeal, the defendants raised due process argu-
ments that the MBTA was unconstitutional both facially and as applied to
their case.91 First, the defendants argued that the MBTA is unconstitu-
tionally vague because it provides inadequate notice of what conduct is
a violation of the MBTA because of the multiplicity of actions that are
criminalized.92 Second, the defendants argued that the “innocuous con-
duct” of predicate acts that may lead to a violation does not provide “fair
notice” of what constitutes criminal conduct, and third, that the lower court
erred in applying these required due process principals to their cases.93
Acknowledging that the “void-for-vagueness doctrine” requires
definition of the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness so that an
ordinary person can understand what conduct is prohibited, the court
85 FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 904–05.
86 Id. at 907.
87 Id. at 902.
88 Id. at 905.
89 United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 680 (10th Cir. 2010).
90 Id. at 682.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 683.
93 Id. at 688.
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stated: “The MBTA is not unconstitutionally vague. It criminalizes a range
of conduct that will lead to the death or captivity of protected migratory
birds, including to ‘pursue, hunt, take, capture, [and] kill. . . .’ 16 U.S.C.
§ 703. The actions criminalized by the MBTA may be legion, but they are
not vague.”94
Regarding the defendants’ “fair notice” argument, which contended
that imposition of a strict liability standard would criminalize apparently
innocent predicate acts such as driving a car, the court framed the ques-
tion as one of “notice or causation,” stating that such inquiries “go to the
heart of due process constraints on criminal statutes.”95 Approving the dis-
trict court’s holding that the defendants must have “proximately caused”
the MBTA violation,96 and relying on Supreme Court cases holding that
foreseeability is central to the due process constraints on criminal statutes,
the Apollo Energies court held that “the MBTA requires a defendant to
proximately cause the statute’s violation for the statute to pass constitu-
tional muster.”97 In so holding, the Tenth Circuit cautioned that, “[w]hen
the MBTA is stretched to criminalize predicate acts that could not have
been reasonably foreseen to result in a proscribed effect on birds, the
statute reaches its constitutional breaking point.”98
The court was careful to clarify the type of “foreseeability” that
must be found for a conviction: it was not the defendants’ knowledge of
the MBTA’s provisions, but the knowledge the defendants had or should
have had that their activity could cause birds’ death.99
94 Id. at 688–89.
95 Apollo Energies Inc., 611 F.3d at 689.
96 Id. at 690 (noting the district court’s heavy reliance on United States v. Moon Lake Elec.
Ass’n, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D.Colo. 1999)). In Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, Judge Babcock, in an
extensively detailed and well-written opinion considering the liability of a rural electrical
utility under the MBTA for incidental taking caused by high-voltage overhead power lines,
addressed the issues of statutory interpretation, legislative history, contrary precedent
from the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, mens rea, due process, “absurd results,” and prosecu-
torial discretion. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1072, 1084, 1088. In finding the
utility liable for the incidental taking, Judge Babcock concluded that proximate cause is an
“important and inherent limiting feature” of the MBTA, and that liability would attach
where the injury “might be reasonably anticipated or foreseen as a natural consequence
of the wrongful act.” Id. at 1085 (internal citations omitted).
97 Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d at 690 (“Proximate causation is not a concept susceptible
of precise definition. . . . We have recently said that proximate causation ‘normally elimi-
nates the bizarre,’ and have noted its ‘functionally equivalent’ alternative characterizations
in terms of foreseeability and duty.” (quoting Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for
a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 713 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring))).
98 Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d at 690.
99 Id. at 691.
2013] DYING FOR A SOLUTION 19
Applying these due process principals to the defendants’ convictions,
the Tenth Circuit upheld the conviction of defendant Apollo Energies, and
one of the convictions of defendant Red Cedar Oil, based on evidence that
the FWS had given them notice of the possibility that protected birds
could enter and become trapped in unscreened exhaust pipes and other
openings of the heater-treaters.100 The court held that it was therefore rea-
sonably foreseeable to Apollo that protected birds could be killed in un-
screened heater-treaters.101 The Tenth Circuit vacated Red Cedar’s second
conviction based on the lack of evidence that, prior to the FWS notice, it
had any knowledge that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that
the heater-treaters would be the cause of migratory bird deaths.102
To summarize the Apollo Energies decision, the court easily found
that the MBTA is more than adequately specific in its statutory prohibi-
tion of a “range of conduct that will lead to the death or captivity of pro-
tected migratory birds.”103 Furthermore, the court concluded that if it is
reasonably foreseeable to a defendant that its conduct has the potential
to cause the death or captivity of a migratory bird, then the defendant can
be held strictly liable for the taking of such birds actually caused by the
conduct.104 Applying this straightforward proposition, the court found that
the defendants Apollo and Red Cedar had the requisite knowledge to fore-
see the potential bird deaths from their conduct because of their knowl-
edge from the FWS notices warning of just such an outcome.105 The Apollo
Energies court’s use of notice as a standard for determining what conse-
quence are reasonablely foreseeable has been incorporated into guidelines
for federal prosecution.106
b. Eighth and Ninth Circuits
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have declined to extend the scope of
the MBTA to include incidental taking.107 These courts have found that the
100 Id. at 682, 689–91.
101 Id. at 691.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 688–89.
104 Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d at 686, 689–90.
105 Id. at 682–83, 691.
106 See Robert S. Anderson & Jill Birchell, Prosecuting Industrial Takings of Protected Avian
Wildlife, U.S. ATTY’S BULL., July 2011, at 65, 75, available at http://www.justice.gov/ej/docs
/USA_Bulletin_072011.pdf (stating that “the government’s approach to industrial avian
takings” is to “provide notice to industry of the risks posed by facilities and equipment”).
107 Newton Cnty Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 115 (8th Cir. 1997);
Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 302–03 (9th Cir. 1991).
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MBTA’s language and legislative history do not support an expansion of lia-
bility for taking that is caused an activity that is not expressly prohibited
by the statute, such as hunting, shooting, trapping, and so on.108
In Newton County Wildlife Ass’n,109 the Eighth Circuit considered
whether the Forest Service’s final action approving timber sales, which
was subject to review under the National Forest Management Act, was
arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law because the agency ignored or
violated its obligations under the MBTA.110 Both the plaintiffs and the
Forest Service agreed that logging under the timber sales would disrupt
nesting migratory birds and kill some.111 Noting the “MBTA’s plain lan-
guage” directed at migratory birds, the court concluded, “[s]trict liability
may be appropriate when dealing with hunters and poachers. But it would
stretch this 1918 statute far beyond the bounds of reason to construe it as
an absolute criminal prohibition on conduct, such as timber harvesting,
that indirectly results in the death of migratory birds.”112
The Eight Circuit cited and agreed with the earlier decision in
Seattle Audubon Society,113 wherein the Ninth Circuit considered whether
timber sales that would destroy suitable habitat for the northern spotted
owl (at that time recently listed as “endangered” under the ESA) and would
result in a taking under Section 703 of the MBTA.114 The Ninth Circuit
took note that the definition of “take” under the ESA included the word
“harm,”115 which was further defined to include “significant habitat modi-
fication or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife,”116 and
that the only cases that had, at that time, found liability under the MBTA
reached as far as “direct, though unintended” bird killings from pesticide
poisoning.117 In declining to extend the prohibition on taking under the
MBTA to an activity that caused habitat destruction that would “indirectly”
lead to bird deaths, the court stated that “[h]abitat destruction causes
‘harm’ to the owls under the ESA but does not ‘take’ them within the
meaning of the MBTA.”118
108 Newton Cnty. Wildlife Ass’n, 113 F.3d at 115; Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 952 F.2d at 302–03.
109 Newton Cnty. Wildlife Ass’n, 113 F.3d at 110.
110 Id. at 114.
111 Id. at 115.
112 Id. (emphasis in original).
113 Id.
114 Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 302 (9th Cir. 1991).
115 Id. at 303.
116 Id. (citing 50. C.F.R. 17.3) (internal citations omitted).
117 Id.
118 Id.
2013] DYING FOR A SOLUTION 21
c. District Courts
Although Apollo Energies has been criticized for inserting a mens
rea–like requirement into a strict liability crime,119 it applied proximate
causation as a limit on the potential due-process problems of strict liability
under Section 703 and of “void-for-vagueness” or lack of “fair notice” re-
garding unspecified predicate crimes.120 This builds upon the more circum-
scribed reasoning of the FMC Corp. decision by incorporating a flexible
limitation that can and has been applied by a number of lower courts in the
interpretation of the MBTA’s taking prohibition to incidental taking from
industrial activities.121
For example, most recently Judge John D. Rainey of the Southern
District of Texas—part of the Fifth Circuit with no prior appellate decisions
on incidental taking under the MBTA—adopted the Tenth Circuit’s ruling
in Apollo Energies that a defendant must have proximately caused the
harm to MBTA-protected birds in order to be liable for a taking.122 The
court refused to vacate defendant CITGO’s 2007 convictions under the
MBTA,123 finding that the bird deaths were reasonably foreseeable to
CITGO when the evidence presented at trial established that it knew as
far back as 1997 that birds were dying in uncovered oil tanks and did noth-
ing to stop or prevent it.124 The CITGO decision broke from the only other
reported district court decision in the Fifth Circuit,125 which held that the
119 See, e.g., Kalyani Robbins, Paved With Good Intentions: The Fate of Strict Liability Under
the Migratory Bird Act, 42 ENVTL. L. 579, 599–600 (2012) (criticizing the Apollo Energies
decision for compromising the strict liability nature of the statute by adding a requirement
that a defendant “knew or should have known” of the potential for bird deaths for a court to
find that the outcome was or should have been reasonably foreseeable to the defendant);
Kevin A. Gaynor et al., Courts Seek Common-Sense Applications to Curb Prosecutions Under
Bird Law, 43 E.R. 974 (2012).
120 United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 688–90 (10th Cir. 2010).
121 See, e.g., United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 893 F. Supp. 2d 841, 847 (S.D.
Tex. 2012).
122 Id.
123 Id. at 848.
124 Id. at 847–48. Although the CITGO court discussed that the “unlawful nature” of CITGO’s
actions (failing to cover tanks in violation of the Federal Clean Air Act and Texas state laws)
distinguished its conduct from incidental taking by defendant oil companies in other cases
where no violation of the MBTA was found, as well as from “otherwise lawful conduct” such
as driving a car or owning a cat or a building with windows, the ruling does not appear to
rest on such a distinction. Rather, the court relied on the findings that the bird deaths were
foreseeable and that the defendant was aware of the deaths and took no action to mitigate
the hazard.
125 Id.
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imposition of criminal penalties on a strict liability basis was inappropriate
where the birds died as an unintended consequence from the conduct of a
legal commercial activity.126
The interesting back story to CITGO’s 2012 attempt to vacate its
2007 convictions under the MBTA began in May 2011 when FWS Special
Agent Richard Grosz found “two dead and oiled mallards” at a well site
operated by Brigham Oil and Gas in North Dakota’s Bakken Shale Oil
Field.127 The birds appeared to have died as a result of exposure to the mud-
laden waste fluids from hydraulic-fracturing and other drilling activities
held in an open “reserve pit” at the well site.128 To migrating birds and
other wildlife the open pits, when covered by a layer of rainwater, are indis-
tinguishable from the numerous ponds and small lakes that dot the open
North Dakota landscape.129 During the same month, Special Agent Grosz
found dead and oiled carcasses of various migratory birds at other well sites
in the Bakken Field, all of which apparently died from exposure to the con-
tents of the reserve pits.130
Shortly after each inspection, at the FWS’s request the United
States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) commenced criminal proceedings
against each company operating the well site where dead birds were
found.131 The DOJ charged each operator with an unlawful taking of migra-
tory birds in violation of the MBTA.132 In each case, a federal magistrate
denied the government’s request for an arrest warrant based on insufficient
probable cause, and “raised another issue: whether ‘migratory bird kills
resulting from lawful commercial activity that is unrelated to hunting or
poaching constitutes a crime under the Migratory Bird Act.’”133
126 United States v. Chevron USA, Inc., 2009 WL 3645170 at *3 (W.D. La. Oct. 30, 2009).
127 United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1203–05 (D.N.D. 2012)
(internal citations omitted).
128 Id. at 1205.
129 Id. at 1211.
130 Id. at 1205–06.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Brigham Oil & Gas, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1204 (internal citations omitted). However, it may
be more accurate to state that the federal magistrate was unclear as to the extent that
Newton County Wildlife Ass’n prohibited the criminal prosecution of the defendants’ conduct
alleged in the requests for summons. A review of the Order Denying Requests for Summons
in United States v. ConocoPhillips Co. finds that the federal magistrate judge was actually
questioning whether Newton Cnty Wildlife Ass’n should be distinguished on its facts from the
cases before the magistrate. 2011 WL 4709887 (D.N.D. Aug. 10, 2011). The magistrate fur-
ther stated, “it may not be absolutely clear from the Eight Circuit’s discussion [in Newton
County Wildlife Ass’n] whether lawful commercial activity that is unrelated to hunting or
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Of the seven defendants, three entered into plea agreements and
the charges against a fourth were dismissed.134 Brigham and two other
operators moved to dismiss the indictments in each of their cases, and the
motions were consolidated to determine if a “taking” had occurred under
the MBTA due to the defendants’ conduct in maintaining the open oil
pits.135 All in all, the three defendants were alleged to have taken seven mi-
gratory birds protected under the MBTA.136
District Court Judge Daniel L. Hovland dismissed the criminal com-
plaints against all of the defendants,137 holding that the MBTA does not
criminalize “lawful commercial activity which may indirectly cause the
death of migratory birds.”138 In reaching his ruling, Judge Hovland found
the decision in Newton County Wildlife Ass’n v. United States Forest Service
to be controlling, wherein the Eighth Circuit held that “timber harvesting
that indirectly resulted in the death of migratory birds was not within the
scope of activity covered by the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.”139 Like timber
harvesting, Judge Hovland found that oil development and production ac-
tivities are not the sort of physical conduct engaged in by hunters and
poachers,140 and therefore such activities did not fall under the prohibitions
of the MBTA.141 Judge Hovland also noted that millions of protected migra-
tory birds are killed each year by a wide variety of human activities,142 and
poaching is beyond the reach of the MBTA completely or only that strict liability cannot be
imposed.” ConocoPhillips Co., 2011 WL 4709887 at *3.
134 Brigham Oil & Gas, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1203.
135 Id. at 1202.
136 Id. at 1202.
137 Id. at 1214.
138 Id. at 1214. However, it should be noted that at the Lippert site the reserve pit was nei-
ther netted nor flagged at the time of the inspection, although the criminal information did
not allege the pit was open at the time of the taking. Under North Dakota law, reserve pits
must be fenced, screened, or netted if the pit is not reclaimed within ninety days after com-
pletion of the well. Brigham had completed drilling at the Lippert site in mid-November
2010, approximately six months before Special Agent Grosz found the dead ducks. There-
fore, it appears possible, if not likely, that Brigham may have been in violation of North
Dakota law by not netting or reclaiming the reserve pit within ninety days of completion of
the well, and consequently may not have been engaged in a “lawful commercial activity” as
described by the court. Id. at 1204–05.
139 Brigham Oil & Gas, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1209, 1211.
140 Id. at 1211.
141 Id. Judge Hovland’s opinion did acknowledge that there were a “few courts” outside of
the Eighth Circuit that applied the MBTA to “indirect, unintentional commercial activity”
including Apollo Energies but concluded that none of the decisions were controlling in the
Eighth Circuit.
142 Id. at 1212.
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opined that “to extend the [MBTA] to reach other activities that indirectly
result in the deaths of covered birds would yield absurd results.”143
The government timely filed a notice of appeal of the Brigham Oil
and Gas decision, but later moved to dismiss its own appeal.144 Slightly
more than a month after the Brigham Oil and Gas decision, CITGO filed
its motion to vacate its 2007 conviction in United States v. CITGO Petro-
leum Corp.,145 specifically highlighting the Brigham Oil and Gas court’s
narrow interpretation of the MBTA’s statutory language and endorsement
of the “absurd result” reasoning.146 As discussed earlier, the District Court
in CITGO Petroleum Corp. declined to follow the Eighth Circuit precedent
and adopted the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Apollo Energies, dismissing de-
fendant CITGO’s motion to vacate its conviction under the MBTA.147
Both CITGO and Brigham Oil and Gas cite the decisions in Seattle
Audubon Society and Newton County Wildlife Ass’n as support for the prop-
osition that Section 703 of the MBTA does not apply to activities beyond
the purposeful hunting, poaching, or possession of migratory birds.148 How-
ever, these and other lower court cases that have relied on these two ap-
pellate rulings present significantly different factual situations that do
not involve habitat modification.149 As pointed out by the Tenth Circuit in
Apollo Energies, the actions at issue in Newton County Wildlife Ass’n (and
143 Id.
144 United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., No.12-1376 (8th Cir.), Notice of Appeal filed
January 14, 2012; Motion to Dismiss granted April 16, 2012. Although the reasons why the
Department of Justice did not pursue the appeal are unclear, Stacey Mitchell, head of the
DOJ’s Environmental Crimes Section, stated at an American Law Institute–American Bar
Association conference in April 2012 that, “[there] isn’t any question” the MBTA “applies to
these takings.” Jeremy P. Jacobs, Republicans Accuse DOJ of Anti-oil Bias in Migratory
Bird Act Prosecutions, E&E NEWS (Jan. 30, 2012), available at http://www.eenews.net/ee
newspm/stories/1059975562.
145 Defendants’ Motion to Vacate, United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 893 F. Supp. 2d
841 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (No. 766). Dick DeGuerin, the Houston lawyer representing CITGO in
the motion, was reportedly “prompted to take action” by the decision in the Brigham Oil
and Gas case. Lawrence Hurley, Lawyers on Alert as Oil Company Challenges Conviction
for Bird Kills, GREENWIRE, May 21, 2012, available at http://www.eenews.net/stories
/1059964700.
146 CITGO Petroleum Corp., 893 F. Supp. 2d at 845.
147 Id. at 847–48.
148 Id. at 843; Brigham Oil & Gas, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1208.
149 See, e.g., Brigham Oil & Gas, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1202 (deaths in drilling fluid waste
ponds at oil production sites); United States v. Chevron USA, Inc., 2009 WL 3645170
(W.D. La. Oct. 30, 2009) (migratory bird deaths from entrapment in uncovered oil produc-
tion equipment); United States v. Ray Westall Operating, Inc., 2009 WL 8691615 (D. N.M.
Feb. 25, 2009) (deaths in oil evaporation pits at oil production facility).
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other cases cited therein) involved an activity “that modified bird habitat
in some way.”150 Finding this distinction dispositive, the court stated,
“[w]hile the MBTA’s scope, like any statute, can test the far reaches in
application, we do not have that case before us. The question here is
whether unprotected oil field equipment can take or kill migratory birds.
It is obvious the oil equipment can.”151
Some courts have attempted to sidestep the factual distinctions be-
tween actions that cause “habitat modification” and other non-hunting
activities that are the actual cause of migratory bird deaths (such as main-
taining drilling waste pits in oil and gas production) by creating a larger
excluded category of “lawful commercial activity” that includes anything
that is “unrelated to hunting and poaching.”152 However, not all “lawful,
commercial activity” fits within the category of “habitat modification,” and
many lower courts which have relied upon the Seattle Audubon Society and
Newton County Wildlife Ass’n decisions to further limit the statutory prohi-
bition of Section 703(a) in cases that are distinguishable on their facts.153
Further, both the Eight Circuit in Newton County Wildlife Ass’n and
the Ninth Circuit in Seattle Audubon Society attempted to differentiate
criminal and legal conduct under the MBTA by discerning which activi-
ties “directly” or “indirectly” result in bird deaths.154 The meaninglessness
of such a distinction was clarified by the decision in Moon Lake Electric
Ass’n,155 wherein Judge Babcock explained:
To the extent [Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans] may be
read to say that the MBTA regulates only physical conduct
normally associated with hunting or poaching, its interpre-
tation of the MBTA is unpersuasive. Foremost, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals’ distinction between an “indirect”
and “direct” “taking” is illogical. By focusing on whether
150 United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 686 (10th Cir. 2010).
151 Id.
152 Brigham Oil & Gas, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1210 (“Other courts have recognized that law-
ful commercial activity, such as logging, that is unrelated to hunting or poaching and not
directed at birds does not constitute a crime under the federal [MBTA].”). See also Chevron
USA, Inc., 2009 WL 3645170 at *3 (“These regulations were clearly not intended to apply
to commercial ventures where, occasionally, protected species might be incidentally killed
as a result of totally legal and permissible activities, as happened here.”).
153 See United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 893 F. Supp. 2d 841, 841 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
154 Newton Cnty. Wildlife Ass’n v. United States Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 115 (8th Cir.
1997); Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 303 (9th Cir. 1991).
155 United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1076–77 (D. Colo. 1999).
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the taking is “direct” or “indirect,” the Court conflates the
causation element with the actus reus element. Although
section 707(a) of the MBTA imposes strict liability, . . . the
government must prove that Moon Lake’s power lines con-
stitute the cause in fact, as well as the proximate cause, of
death. . . . While the proximate causation analysis necessar-
ily requires the trier of fact to determine whether a particu-
lar type of physical conduct has a propensity to injure or kill
a protected bird, that analysis is subsumed within the cau-
sation element and has no bearing on the particular types
of physical conduct prohibited by the MBTA. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals’ distinction between an “indirect”
and “direct” taking or killing, therefore, is unpersuasive.156
After discussing the Supreme Court’s analysis of the meaning of
“take” in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter,157 and noting that the definitions
of “kill” and “take” contemporaneous with the passage of the MBTA did not
include the word “directly” or suggest in any way that only direct applica-
tions of force constitute “killing” or “taking,”158 Judge Babcock concluded:
The MBTA’s language suggests that Congress intended the
term ‘kill’ to serve a particular function, distinct from the
functions of the other 18 types of proscribed conduct. To hold
otherwise would deny the word “kill” independent mean-
ing and essentially read that word out of the MBTA and
the Secretary’s definition of “take.” . . . For these reasons,
I decline to follow the Ninth Circuit’s analysis. Again, I ex-
press no opinion regarding whether the MBTA is intended
to preclude habitat modification or degradation. That is-
sue is not before me. Rather, I reject here only that part of
[Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans] which may be read to hold
that the MBTA regulates only the sort of physical conduct
exhibited by hunters and poachers.159
156 Id. (citations omitted). The opinion also stated that making a distinction between
“indirect” and “direct” conduct reads into the MBTA a mens rea of intent and ignores the
strict liability nature of Section 707(a) under United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796 (10th
Cir. 1997).
157 Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1077–78.
158 Id. at 1078–79.
159 Id. at 1079 (citations omitted). In his opinion, Judge Babcock dismissed Newton County
Wildlife Ass’n and two other cases cited by defendant Moon Lake as merely citing Seattle
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Therefore, to the extent that numerous courts have relied upon
Seattle Audubon Society for the fundamental proposition that Section
703(a) of the MBTA does not apply to activities beyond purposeful hunt-
ing or possession of a migratory bird, the courts simply misread both the
factual scope of Seattle Audubon Society, and incorporated a false dichot-
omy between “direct” and “indirect” actions.
d. Summary of Judicial Interpretations
To summarize the current law on incidental taking under the
MBTA, a majority of appellate and lower courts have found that inciden-
tal taking of protected species is subject to misdemeanor liability under
Section 703(a), so long as the conduct of such activity is both the actual
and proximate cause of the taking. Although a minority of authorities
would limit misdemeanor liability to only those actions associated with
hunting or poaching, this position is based on an unwarranted extension
of factually distinguishable precedent and questionable reasoning re-
garding the application of proximate causation.
The current trend of judicial authority is towards the expanded view
of the MBTA’s prohibitions to include incidental taking with an outer limit
of activities that are too attenuated under a probable causation analysis.160
Examples of this outer limit may include situations where the taking may
be foreseeable but either highly unlikely (such as killing from a random
impact with a bird while driving a car),161 or more attenuated in the actual
causation component of the analysis (such as the destruction or degrada-
tion of a species’ habit without any actual taking of a member of the spe-
cies in the course of such activity).162
Ultimately, it may be reasonable to conclude that the minority view
is defending an untenable and shrinking argument against the mainte-
nance of federal protections for the nation’s bird and wildlife resources.
These protections started with the passage of the MBTA and the Lacey
Act,163 and came to fruition in the 1970s and afterwards with the passage
Audubon Society with approval as containing “no meaningful analysis of their own.” He
distinguished a fourth, Mahler v. United States Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D. Ind.
1996), as relying on legislative history that “reads into the MBTA ambiguities that do not
exist,” which is supported in the opinion with an exhaustive review of the legislative
history. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1079–82.
160 See, e.g., Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1070.
161 United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 535 (E.D. Cal. 1978).
162 Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991).
163 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2006); 16 U.S.C. §§ 3771–3778.
28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 38:1
of the ESA and the Marine Mammal Protection Act.164 Absent a change
in that long-standing policy, it seems unlikely that the nation’s foremost
avian protection law, which has been in force for nearly 100 years and is
credited with the preservation of hundreds of species,165 would lack the flex-
ibility to protect migratory birds from both the exploitation of a bygone era
and the man-made threats of the modern industrial age.
II. CURRENT PROSECUTIONS OF INCIDENTAL TAKING
The Secretary of the Interior (“Secretary”) has the primary respon-
sibility to administer and enforce the MBTA, which in turn is delegated
to the FWS who enforces the taking prohibition in Section 703166 through
criminal prosecution by the DOJ.167 Unlike some other federal laws that
protect wildlife, the MBTA does not have a citizen suit provision,168 and
there is no statutory provision providing for the issuance of permits to
allow any taking—incidental or otherwise—of individual specimens of a
protected species without violating Section 703.169 However, Section 703
does provide that the Secretary is authorized to issue regulations to allow
taking that is compatible with the Migratory Bird Conventions.170
Although the Secretary has created a number of exceptions that
permit incidental taking in specific limited circumstances or as directed by
Congress,171 she has not exercised her regulatory authority to create a
broadly applicable permit for incidental taking.172 Therefore, since there
is no statutory or regulatory mechanism to exempt incidental taking from
the prohibitions of Section 703, an “informal” or “unofficial” practice has
developed over time to limit the prosecution of incidental taking under the
MBTA.173 The application of this practice as applied to non-federal actors
is discussed in Part A, below, and issues concerning the prosecution of
incidental taking by federal actors are discussed in Part B, below.
164 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361–1407 (2012).
165 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2006).
166 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–704 (2012).
167 16 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).
168 Flint Hills Tallgrass Prairie Heritage Found., Inc. v. Scottish Power, PLC, 147 Fed. Appx.
785 (10th Cir. 2005); Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 882 F.2d 1294, 1301 (8th Cir. 1989).
169 16. U.S.C. § 703 (2012).
170 16 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2012); Fund For Animals v. Norton, 281 F. Supp. 2d 209, 217
(D.D.C. 2003).
171 See supra note 66.
172 See infra Part II.B.2.
173 FINAL WIND ENERGY GUIDELINES, supra note 39, at 4.
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A. Incidental Taking by Non-Federal Actors
1. Prosecutorial Discretion
Historically, the limiting mechanism on the prosecution of inci-
dental taking under the MBTA by non-federal persons has been the exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion by the FWS.174 This discretion has been
used in conjunction with efforts to obtain the voluntary cooperation of
certain parties and industries whose activities have caused, or have the
potential to cause, incidental taking by consulting with the agency and
taking steps to mitigate such taking. Indeed, prosecutorial discretion is
the primary incentive for such cooperation, as reflected in various non-
regulatory “guidelines” that the FWS has created as applicable to specific
industries or activities to mitigate taking from the development and oper-
ations of their facilities. For example, in 2000 the FWS issued guidelines
for the siting and operation of antenna towers, which provides:
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act (16 U.S.C. 703–712) pro-
hibits the taking, killing, possession, transportation, and
importation of migratory birds, their eggs, parts, and nests,
except when specifically authorized by the Department of
the Interior. While the Act has no provision for allowing
unauthorized take, it must be recognized that some birds
may be killed at structures such as communications tow-
ers even if all reasonable measures to avoid it are imple-
mented. The Service’s Division of Law Enforcement carries
out its mission to protect migratory birds not only through
investigations and enforcement, but also through fostering
relationships with individuals and industries that proac-
tively seek to eliminate their impacts on migratory birds.
While it is not possible under the Act to absolve individuals
or companies from liability if they follow these recommended
guidelines, the Division of Law Enforcement and Depart-
ment of Justice have used enforcement and prosecutorial
discretion in the past regarding individuals or companies
who have made good faith efforts to avoid the take of migra-
tory birds.175
174 See infra notes 175 and 178.
175 Letter from Jamie Rappaport Clark, Director FWS, to Regional Directors, Service Guid-
ance on the Siting, Construction, Operation and Decommissioning of Communications
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The FWS recently incorporated this practice of fostering coopera-
tion through discretionary enforcement of the MBTA into the 2013 Final
Wind Energy Guidelines,176 although use of the term “prosecutorial dis-
cretion” was not used:
The Service urges voluntary adherence to the Guidelines
and communication with the Service when planning and op-
erating a facility. While it is not possible to absolve individu-
als or companies from MBTA or BGEPA [Bald and Golden
Eagle Protection Act] liability, the Office of Law Enforce-
ment focuses its resources on investigating and prosecuting
those who take migratory birds without identifying and im-
plementing reasonable and effective measures to avoid the
take. The Service will regard a developer’s or operator’s ad-
herence to these Guidelines, including communication with
the Service, as appropriate means of identifying and imple-
menting reasonable and effective measures to avoid the take
of species protected under the MBTA and BGEPA. The Chief
of Law Enforcement or more senior official of the Service will
make any decision whether to refer for prosecution any al-
leged take of such species, and will take such adherence and
communication fully into account when exercising discre-
tion with respect to such potential referral.177
The FWS has also jointly issued guidelines for electrical transmis-
sion activities with an industry study group in 2005, known as the Avian
Protection Plan Guidelines,178 which provide that a violator’s “disregard
for their actions and the law” will be taken into account when a prosecu-
tion is being considered.179
Towers (Sept. 14, 2000) [hereinafter Service Guidance on the Siting, Construction, Oper-
ation and Decommissioning of Communications Towers], available at http://www.fws.gov
/migratorybirds/CurrentBirdIssues/Hazards/towers/comtow.html (emphasis added).
176 FINAL WIND ENERGY GUIDELINES, supra note 39, at 6.
177 Id.
178 THE EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE’S AVIAN POWER LINE INTERACTION COMMITTEE, U.S.
FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., AVIAN PROTECTION PLAN (APP) GUIDELINES 15 (Apr. 2005),
[hereinafter AVIAN PROTECTION PLAN (APP) GUIDELINES], available at http://www.fws.gov
/migratorybirds/CurrentBirdIssues/Hazards/APP/AVIAN PROTECTION PLAN FINAL
4 19 05.pdf.
179 Id.
Unless the take is authorized, it is not possible to absolve individuals,
companies, or agencies from liability even if they implement avian mor-
tality avoidance or similar conservation measures. However, the Office
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Statements by FWS personnel reinforce the agency’s reliance on
the practice or policy of discretionary prosecution to promote cooperation
with agency guidelines. For example, in a 2012 meeting sponsored by the
American Wind Wildlife Institute (“AWWI”), a senior FWS representa-
tive stated: “How do we deal with the fact that the Service doesn’t issue
MBTA permits? From our agency’s perspective, if a company meets with us,
develops a conservation plan, and follows our recommendations to avoid
and minimize impacts to birds, then we are comfortable with not issuing
take permits.”180
The FWS practice of using discretionary prosecution to encour-
age compliance is also described in a 2011 article published in the United
States Attorneys’ Bulletin as internal guidance for Department of Justice
prosecutors:
The Apollo decision supports the government’s approach to
industrial avian takings that has developed over the past
two decades: provide notice to industry of the risks posed
by facilities and equipment, encourage compliance through
remediation, adaptive management and, where possible,
permitting, and reserve for prosecution those cases in which
companies ignore, deny, or refuse to comply with a BMP ap-
proach to avian protection in conducting their business.181
In the context of renewable energy projects, the FWS’s practice is
currently being used to encourage developers to follow its voluntary guide-
lines for the siting, design, and operation of projects and associated infra-
structure to mitigate incidental taking of protected species.182 For example,
in recent comments to a proposed solar electric generating facility in the
Southern California desert, the FWS stated that the project “poses poten-
tially significant levels of incidental take to numerous species of migratory
birds,”183 and recommended implementation of the Avian and Power Line
of Law Enforcement focuses on those individuals, companies, or agencies
that take migratory birds with disregard for their actions and the law,
especially when conservation measures have been developed but are not
properly implemented.
180 David Cottingham, Policy and Regulation Update, PROCEEDINGS OF THE WIND-
WILDLIFE RESEARCH MEETING IX (2012), available at http://www.nationalwind.org/assets
/research_meetings/NWCC_WWRM_IX_Proceedings__06-27-13_.pdf.
181 Anderson & Birchell, supra note 106, at 75.
182 Id. at 66, 81.
183 Letter from Kennon A. Corey, Assistant Field Supervisor, FWS, to Pierre Martinez,
Compliance Project Manager, Cal. Energy Comm’n, Request for Agency Participation on
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Interaction Committee’s guidelines to reduce the risks to birds.184 The com-
ments further stated that the proposed project was without a legal mech-
anism to permit such taking under the MBTA,185 and cautioned that a
“robust” Bird and Bat Conservation Strategy “that avoids and minimizes
impacts to these trust resources is imperative” should be considered.186
The FWS has considerable discretion in deciding whom and when
to prosecute for a violation of the MBTA.187 Prosecutorial discretion has
been recognized by the courts as a limiting factor on the enforcement of
the MBTA to avoid prosecutions that “would offend reason and common
sense.”188 It is, however, a mechanism that is disfavored by the courts to
limit criminal prosecutions in general and under the MBTA in particular.189
Further, as discussed below, its use as part of a practice to encourage com-
pliance with voluntary guidelines is ineffective, possibly a violation of fed-
eral environmental laws, and fails to promote the conservation of conserve
MBTA-protected species.
2. Prosecution of Incidental Taking from Wind Energy Activities
Although there have been numerous successful prosecutions under
the MBTA for incidental taking,190 to date there has been only one prose-
cution of a wind energy project developer or operator under the MBTA,191
despite several documented cases of migratory bird taking at wind energy
projects.192 This stunning lack of referrals raises a number of important
the Proposed Rio Mesa Solar Electric Generating Facility, Riverside County, California
at 6 (Jan. 17, 2012), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitingcases/riomesa/documents
/others/2012-01-17_USFWS_Comments_TN-63403.pdf.
184 Id. at 4.
185 Id. at 6.
186 Id.
187 Alaska Fish & Wildlife Fed’n & Outdoor Council v. Dunkle, 829 F.2d 933, 938 (9th
Cir. 1987).
188 United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 905 (2d Cir. 1978).
189 See, e.g., United States v. Moon Lake Electric Ass’n, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1084 (D. Colo.
1999); Mahler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp. 1559, 1582–83 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
190 See supra Part I.B.3.
191 United States v. Duke Energy Renewables, Inc., 2:13-CR-00286-KHR-1 (D. Wyo.,
Nov. 22, 2013).
192 See Lawrence Hurley, Obama Admin Sweats Legal Response as Turbines Kill Birds,
GREENWIRE (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059959021; Press Release,
Am. Bird Conservancy, Massive Bird Kill at West Virginia Wind Farm Highlights National
Issue (Oct. 28, 2011), available at http://www.abcbirds.org/newsandreports/releases/111
028.html.
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issues and questions about the FWS’s MBTA enforcement policy regard-
ing wind energy projects.
Preliminarily, it is important to emphasize that compliance with
the Final Wind Energy Guidelines, and with any advice or comments from
the FWS regarding a particular project, is completely voluntary.193 How-
ever, developers and operators are cautioned that, “[i]f they reject [FWS’s
advice], they should contemporaneously document with reasoned justifi-
cation why they did so.”194 Developers and operators are further cautioned
that the FWS may “refer for prosecution any unlawful take that it believes
to be reasonably related to lack of incorporation of Service recommenda-
tions or insufficient adherence with the Final Wind Energy Guidelines.”195
Although the FWS released the Final Wind Energy Guidelines in 2012,
it had previously issued guidance to address the impacts of wind energy
development and a number of drafts of the wind guidelines, and since 2003
encouraged voluntary compliance with the provisions of these previous
guidelines and prior drafts.196
As described below, the FWS’s practice of using prosecutorial dis-
cretion to encourage compliance with non-regulatory guidance such as the
Final Wind Energy Guidelines, as well as its actual exercise of prosecu-
torial discretion to limit enforcement of the MBTA as to wind energy ac-
tivities, have several potential and documented adverse effects, and raised
a number of significant legal issues.197
Adverse Effects. First, the failure to prosecute incidental taking by
wind energy operators under the MBTA is likely resulting in the prevent-
able deaths of thousands of protected migratory birds.198 Although some
incidental taking of protected birds is inevitable in the operation of wind
energy facilities, at the very least the lack of prosecutions to enforce the
MBTA allows continuing non-compliance with the various voluntary wind
energy guidelines that have been in place since 2003.199 If the threat of
prosecution is to have any incentivizing effect at all, diligent enforcement
of the MBTA’s taking prohibition will be necessary for the Final Wind
193 FINAL WIND ENERGY GUIDELINES, supra note 39, at 4.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 1.
197 AM. BIRD CONSERVANCY, RULEMAKING PETITION TO THE U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE
FOR REGULATING THE IMPACTS OF WIND ENERGY PROJECTS ON MIGRATORY BIRDS, at 77–78
(Dec. 14, 2011) [hereinafter RULEMAKING PETITION], available at http://www.abcbirds.org
/abcprograms/policy/collisions/pdf/wind_rulemaking_petition.pdf.
198 Id. at 76–77.
199 Id. at 41.
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Energy Guidelines to be effective as the principal tool for mitigating in-
cidental taking as the wind energy industry expands.200
The recent and only criminal prosecution under the MBTA for tak-
ing at a wind energy project illustrates the ineffectiveness of using prosecu-
torial discretion to incentivize compliance with voluntary guidelines, and
the adverse effects that result from prosecution after a wind energy devel-
oper has ignored the voluntary guidelines and developed a wind project in
an inappropriate site. In United States v. Duke Energy Renewables, Inc.,201
the defendant was charged with misdemeanor violations of Section 703 of
the MBTA stemming from the deaths of 14 Golden Eagles and 149 other
protected birds at the defendant’s “Campbell Hill” and “Top of the World”
wind energy projects in Wyoming between 2009 and 2013.202 According to
the charges and other information presented in court, the defendant failed
to make all reasonable efforts to build the projects in a way that would
avoid the risk of avian deaths by collision with turbine blades, despite
prior warnings about potential takings from the FWS.203
The prosecution of Duke Energy Renewables was resolved by a plea
bargain that demonstrates how the FWS’s discretionary enforcement policy
failed to deter non-compliance with the guidelines or remedy the adverse
effects of such non-compliance on protected birds.204 First of all, the threat
of prosecution under the MBTA was an inadequate incentive for Duke
Energy Renewables to pay heed to the FWS’s direct feedback on the in-
adequacies of the pre-development wildlife surveys or its “continued . . .
concerns” about impacts to avian wildlife from the siting and development
of the projects.205 Further, the threat of prosecution under the MBTA was
an inadequate incentive to deter Duke Energy Renewables from proceeding
with the development and commercial operation of both projects, without
even the minimal effort of developing an avian conservation plan to miti-
gate the takings that were projected to occur.206 Finally, as described below,
200 Id. at 79.
201 United States v. Duke Energy Renewables, Inc., No. 2:13-cr-00268, 2013 BL (D. Wyo.,
Nov. 22, 2013) (Wyoming is located in the Tenth Circuit, which has upheld the prose-
cution of incidental takings from industrial activities under the MBTA. United States v.
Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 688–89 (10th Cir. 2010)).
202 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Utility Company Sentenced in Wyoming for Killing
Protected Birds at Wind Projects (Nov. 22, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa
/pr/2013/November/13-enrd-1253 (last visited Dec. 11, 2013).
203 Id.
204 Plea Agreement, Duke Energy Renewables, Inc., No. 2:13-CR-00268, 2013 BL (D. Wyo.
Nov. 7, 2013) (No. 2) [hereinafter Plea Agreement].
205 Id. at Statement of Facts, *5, 4–8.
206 Id.
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the terms of the sentence that Duke Energy Renewables received are un-
likely to deter future violators from ignoring the voluntary guidelines.207
• The $1 million in fines and restitution to be paid by
Duke Energy Renewables is a relatively inconse-
quential penalty, amounting to less than 0.3% of the
two projects’ minimum combined construction costs
of $358 million.208
• Duke Energy Renewables is allowed to continue op-
erations of the two wind energy facilities in spite of
the fact that the projects do not comply with the cri-
teria of the FWS’s voluntary guidelines for the siting
and development of such projects.209
• Although Duke Energy Renewables is obligated to
develop and implement a “Migratory Bid Compliance
Plan” (“MBCP”) to conduct studies and implement a
variety to measures to mitigate the taking of mi-
gratory birds and golden eagles (including an Eagle
Conservation Plan and pursing an Eagle Take Per-
mit under the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection
Act210), the MBCP arguably does not require any
practices, actions or cost to the defendant beyond
what would likely have been required under the
FWS’s voluntary guidelines for mitigation and oper-
ation of similar high-risk projects.211
207 On November 22, 2013, the defendant’s guilty plea to two misdemeanor violations of
MBTA Section 703 was entered and the defendant was sentenced to monetary fines of
$200,000 for each count, $600,000 restitution for both counts, and sixty months probation
with “special conditions”. Minute Entry, Duke Energy Renewables, Inc., No. 2:13-CR-00268,
at *2 (D. Wyo. Nov. 22, 2013) (No. 6).
208 Although Duke Energy has not publicly disclosed the costs of the two projects, each
project received a “Section 109 Permit” from the Wyoming Department of Environmental
Quality Industrial Siting Council, which was then required only for projects with con-
struction costs of $178.9 million or more. See WY. STAT. ANN. § 35-12-109(vii) (2012); Top
of the World Wind Energy, LLC, Docket No. DEQ/ISC 09-03 (Dec. 31, 2009), http://deq.state
.wy.us/isd/downloads/09-03_TopOfTheWorld.pdf; Section 109 Permit Application, Duke
Energy Corp, Campbell Hill Windpower Project ES-1 (Jan. 2009), available at http://deq.state
.wy.us/isd/downloads/Campbell_Hill_All_Combined_Final_010709.pdf; Industrial Siting
News, WYO. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, http://deq.state.wy.us./isd/isdnews.htm (scroll down
to December 2009 and March 2009) (last visited Dec. 11, 2013).
209 Plea Agreement, supra note 204, at Statement of Facts, *1–12.
210 Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (“BGEPA”), 16 U.S.C. § 668–668d (2012); 50
C.F.R. § 22.26–22.27 (2013).
211 Plea Agreement, supra note 204, at* Attachment B “Migratory Bird Compliance Plan.”
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• Finally, Duke Energy Renewables received a non-
prosecution agreement from the DOJ for any takings
at all four of the defendant’s Wyoming wind energy
projects under both the MBTA and the BGEPA
before or after the date of the Plea Agreement for a
period of up to almost ten years, so long as Duke
Energy Renewables is in compliance with the terms
of the Plea Agreement (including implementation
of the MCBP) and is diligently pursuing an Eagle
Take Permit.212 In other words, Duke Energy Renew-
ables received de facto permits for recurring inciden-
tal taking under the MBTA (even though there is
not regulatory or other mechanism for the issuance
of such a permit213) and under the BGEPA (even
though it has not demonstrated that the incidental
of protected eagles is “compatible with the preser-
vation of the . . . golden eagle” and is “unavoidable”
as required for such a permit214).
Finally, the prosecution and settlement of the Duke Energy Renew-
ables case illustrates a fundamental flaw of the FWS’s policy of incentiv-
izing compliance with the threat of prosecution: preventative regulation
(such as the siting analysis in the Final Wind Energy Guidelines) is effec-
tive only if it is enforced before the harm occurs.215 Poorly sited projects
such as the “Campbell Hill” and “Top of the World” wind projects will
remain in operation killing protected birds for decades. As clearly demon-
strated by the Duke Energy Renewables prosecution and plea agreement,
fines may be paid and mitigation measures implemented, but poor siting
of projects, and its adverse effect on avian conservation efforts, will not be
corrected with after-the-fact prosecution.
Second, the FWS’s use of voluntary guidelines and prosecutorial
discretion to encourage compliance may be hurting the renewable energy
industry more than it is helping it.216 Given the risks to developers and in-
vestors in solar and wind energy projects, where the taking of migratory
birds is almost certain to occur, it would be surprising if these parties
212 Id. at *10–12.
213 See supra note 66 and accompanying discussion.
214 See infra Part III.C.a(3).
215 See RULEMAKING PETITION, supra note 197, at 83–84.
216 Id. at 57.
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would not prefer something more substantial than a vague promise that
a prosecution will not follow an incidental taking if the voluntary guide-
lines are followed. Although the rapid growth of the wind energy industry
may suggest that this uncertainty has not been a substantial drag on de-
velopment, antidotal evidence implies that it may be adversely affecting
the growth of the industry to the detriment of renewable energy and other
policy goals.217
Third, the lack of prosecutions of wind energy developers or oper-
ators creates a strong inference that prosecutorial discretion is being exer-
cised unevenly to favor wind energy over other activities such as the oil
and gas industry.218 Specifically, after the Brigham Oil and Gas decision
in 2012, Republican Senators David Vitter and Lamar Alexander ques-
tioned the FWS’s motivations for prosecuting MBTA cases against oil and
gas producers in a letter to the Attorney General.219 Senator, and then–
Republican presidential candidate Newt Gingrich, requested that the
House Judiciary Committee investigate how the Obama administration
chooses to enforce the MBTA,220 and then–Presidential candidate Mitt
Romney brought up the subject of selective enforcement of the MBTA
during the 2012 debates.221
217 See Ryan Tracy, Wildlife Slows Wind Power—New U.S. Rules to Protect Bats and Birds
Create Uncertainty in Growing Industry, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2011, at A3, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203501304577088593307132850.html.
218 See Letter from Sen. David Vitter, Ranking Member of Sen. Energy & Pub. Works
Comm., & Sen. Lamar Alexander, to Atty. Gen. Eric Holder (Jan. 30, 2012), available at
http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Minority.PressReleases
&ContentRecord_id=8c84134d-a36c-2155-a554-dc81eaded88a.
219 We find it absurd that the Department of Justice, in conjunction with the
Fish and Wildlife Service, could reasonably conclude that three oil and gas
operators should face prosecution for the incidental killing of seven birds
at the same time it considers permits [to a wind energy farm in south-
eastern Minnesota] to kill between eight and fifteen bald eagles. . . .
Please explain the apparent targeting of oil and gas producers for vio-
lations of the MBTA.
Id.
220 See Press Release, The American Presidency Project, Gingrich Requests House Inves-
tigation of DOJ over Potential Abuse of Power against ND Oil Companies (Feb. 22, 2012),
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=99783#axzz2hpUSE7UM (“The gov-
ernment’s case was a clear abuse of the justice system, and amounted to harassment of
oil companies for motives unrelated to migratory birds,” Gingrich said. “It is deeply dis-
turbing that the Justice Department would abuse its authority in such a manner.”).
221 Transcript of Second Presidential Debate (Oct. 16, 2012), http://debates.org/index.php
?page=october-1-2012-the-second-obama-romney-presidential-debate.
ROMNEY: So where’d the increase [in oil production] come from? Well
a lot of it came from the Bakken Range in North Dakota. What was
[President Obama’s] participation there? The administration brought
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Although these complaints may be more about politics than plovers,
they do raise the valid question of what is the FWS’s policy that dictates
when, where, and against whom will an enforcement action for an inci-
dental taking under the MBTA be referred for prosecution? From its own
statements, the FWS has an internal practice that a violator’s adherence
to guidelines and implementation of FWS’s recommendations will result
in a lower likelihood of prosecution.222 But, the lack of clear guidelines for
many industrial activities, and the failure to bring enforcement actions
against wind energy producers when FWS guidelines may have been vio-
lated, give the appearance that prosecutorial discretion is being applied un-
evenly and with the possible intention of favoring a specific industry.223 In
short, an enforcement policy that relies on prosecutorial discretion without
clear guidelines for its application, and the consistent and vigorous en-
forcement of the law against wind energy, oil and gas, or any other indus-
try when violations do occur, undermine the credibility of both the policy
and the enforcement agency.
Legal Issues. First, the practice of using prosecutorial discretion may
constitute a violation of the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”),224
which requires federal agencies to conduct an environmental review of
“major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment.”225 A failure to comply with NEPA, if applicable, would cir-
cumvent the statute’s primary purpose of requiring all federal agencies to
take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of their actions.226
Although a detailed discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of
this Article, it is important to note that there are several bases upon which
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion may be considered to be a “[m]ajor
[f]ederal action” subject to NEPA, including the following:
a criminal action against the people drilling up there for oil, this mas-
sive new resource we have. And what was the cost? 20 or 25 birds were
killed and brought out a migratory bird act to go after them on a crim-
inal basis.
Id.
222 See FINAL WIND ENERGY GUIDELINES, supra note 39.
223 See, e.g., Obama Administration Gives Wind Farms a Pass on Eagle Deaths, Prosecutes
Oil Companies, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 14, 2013; Michael Bastasch, Obama Doesn’t
Punish Wind Industry for Bird Deaths, Goes After Oil Companies, THE DAILY CALLER
(May 14, 2013, 11:25 AM), http://dailycaller.com/2013/05/14/obama-doesnt-punish-wind
-industry-for-bird-deaths-goes-after-oil-companies/.
224 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331–4370 (2012).
225 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b) (2013).
226 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989).
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• The development and promulgation of the various
guidelines expressly incorporating the practice of
factoring compliance or non-compliance into the
considerations for prosecution of violations under
the MBTA may considered a “[m]ajor [f]ederal ac-
tion” to the extent such documents are deemed
to be “formal documents establishing an agency’s
policies which will result in or substantially alter
agency programs.”227
• The systematic use of prosecutorial discretion may
be considered to be a “[m]ajor [f]ederal action” to the
extent such action is deemed to be the “[a]doption of
programs, such as a group of concerted actions to im-
plement a specific policy or plan; systematic and con-
nected agency decisions allocating agency resources
to implement a specific statutory program or exec-
utive directive.”228
• The exercise of discretion not to prosecute a MBTA
violation for incidental taking may be functionally
equivalent to the granting of a “special purpose
permit” that permits taking “for special purpose
activities related to migratory birds . . . which are
otherwise outside the scope of the standard form
permits . . . .”229 The FWS has acknowledged that
the processing of an application for a special pur-
pose permit requires compliance with NEPA.230
• Some commentators argue that the very act of exer-
cising discretion not to prosecute a violation of fed-
eral law that may affect the environment may itself
be a “[m]ajor [f]ederal action,” even though NEPA
regulations define “[m]ajor [f]ederal actions” as
227 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b)(1) (2013).
228 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b)(3) (2013).
229 50 C.F.R. § 21.27 (2013).
230 See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., PACIFIC REGION, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT—
ISSUANCE OF AN MBTA PERMIT TO THE N.M.F.S. AUTHORIZING TAKE OF SEABIRDS IN THE
HAWAII-BASED SHALLOW-SET LONGLINE FISHERY 9 (July 27, 2012) [hereinafter FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.fws.gov/pacific/migratorybirds/pdf
/NMFS Permit Final EA.pdf (“This assessment is produced in compliance with NEPA as
well as to formalize our decision process for this permit.”); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b)(4) (2013).
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excluding “bringing judicial or administrative civil
or criminal enforcement actions.”231
Second, some commentators have questioned whether the FWS’s
conduct could rise to the level of an ongoing “pattern of non-enforcement
of clear statutory language” that amounts to “an abdication of its statu-
tory responsibilities,”232 which may be a violation of the Administrative
Procedures Act.233
Third, prosecutorial discretion is, by its very nature, discretionary,
which may result in the “under-enforcement” or “over-enforcement” of the
MBTA. The problem of under-enforcement was discussed by the court in
Center for Biological Diversity v. Pirie,234 as well as the need for a “private
attorney general” to enforce the MBTA when the FWS fails to prosecute
clear violations of its provisions.235 On the other hand, some commentators
have raised the concern of over-enforcement by an administration that
favors a broad interpretation of the statute,236 or the “overcriminalization”
of a law by a “self-righteous prosecution.”237
The result of such inaction, allegations, ambiguity, and opacity
undermines the FWS’s credibility, and possibly its legal authority, as the
unbiased enforcer of the nation’s wildlife laws in general and of the MBTA
in particular. Further, the FWS’s uneven enforcement of the MBTA is pos-
sibly causing significant and continuing harm to the nation’s avian re-
sources. Therefore, the FWS’s current MBTA enforcement policy that relies
231 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(a) (2013). But see DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIG.
§ 8:26 (2012).
This exemption is not justified. The applicability of the impact statement
requirement to agency enforcement adjudication does not raise questions
qualitatively different from those raised by the application of this require-
ment to other federal agency actions. . . . Exemption of enforcement ad-
judication from the impact statement requirement would allow agencies
to avoid their impact statement responsibilities by proceeding through
adjudication rather than rule making.
Id.
232 See RULEMAKING PETITION, supra note 197, at 77 (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S.
821, 833, n.4 (1985)).
233 Id.
234 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Pirie, 191 F. Supp. 2d 161 (D.D.C. 2002), vacated on
other gds. by Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. England, 2003 WL 179848 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
235 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 177.
236 Benjamin Means, Note, Prohibiting Conduct, Not Consequences: The Limited Reach
of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 97 MICH. L. REV. 823, 834–36 (1998).
237 Norman L. Reimer, When It Comes to Overcriminalization, Prosecutorial Discretion Is
for the Birds, CHAMPION, Sept./Oct. 2012, at 9.
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principally on prosecutorial discretion is indefensible and unsustainable.
In Part III, several possible legislative and regulatory solutions are dis-
cussed to fill the vacuum created by the FWS’s current enforcement policy.
B. Incidental Taking by Federal Actors
1. Federal Agencies Other than Armed Forces
For some time there was a question of whether the MBTA applied
to federal agencies and personnel.238 This long-standing controversy was
resolved in Humane Society v. Glickman,239 where the plaintiffs brought
action against the Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) to enjoin imple-
mentation of a management plan for Canadian geese in Virginia.240 The
management plan sought to control the geese population by various mea-
sures, including killing some geese.241 The USDA contended that it did not
need to seek a permit under the MBTA before taking or killing such birds,
which was supported by the FWS following a reversal of its prior long-
standing position that the MBTA applied to federal agencies.242
The Glickman court held that the USDA was not exempt from the
MBTA’s prohibition on taking, and that its taking and killing of Canadian
geese in the implementation of the management plan without obtaining a
permit violated Section 703.243 In reaching this conclusion, the court stated:
As § 703 is written, what matters is whether someone has
killed or is attempting to kill or capture or take a protected
bird, without a permit and outside of any designated hunt-
ing season. Nothing in § 703 turns on the identity of the
perpetrator. There is no exemption in § 703 for farmers, or
golf course superintendents, or ornithologists, or airport
officials, or state officers, or federal agencies.244
238 See Newton Cnty. Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 115 (8th Cir. 1997);
Sierra Club v. Martin, 110 F.3d 1551, 1555 (11th Cir. 1997).
239 Humane Soc’y v. Glickman, 217 F.3d 882 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
240 Id. at 883.
241 Id. at 884.
242 Id. at 884–85.
243 Id. at 888. The Glickman court also stated, “we disagree with the ‘tentative conclusion’
in Newton County Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., and the holding in Sierra Club v.
Martin, that § 703 does not apply to federal agencies.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
244 Id. at 885.
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It should be noted that the Glickman court also held that private
parties can use the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)245 to seek an
injunction against a federal agency for actions that violate the MBTA.246
On January 10, 2001, President Clinton issued Executive Order
13186, “Responsibilities of Federal Agencies to Protect Migratory Birds,”
which provides in relevant part:
Each Federal agency taking actions that have, or are likely
to have, a measurable negative effect on migratory bird
populations is directed to develop and implement, within
2 years, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the
Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) that shall promote the
conservation of migratory bird populations.247
In addition to directing each federal agency to enter into a MOU
with the FWS, the agencies are mandated to incorporate bird conserva-
tion considerations (including NEPA analysis) into agency planning,248
and to promote the conservation of migratory birds within the limits of
the agency’s mission and budget.249 The Executive Order also directs the
Secretary of Interior to establish an interagency “Council for the Conser-
vation of Migratory Birds” to oversee implementation of the order.250
To date, the FWS has entered into MOUs with nine federal depart-
ments and agencies,251 including the Department of Defense,252 Department
245 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (2012).
246 Glickman, 217 F.3d at 886. See also Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Pirie, 191 F. Supp. 2d
161, 175 (D.D.C. 2002), vacated by United States v. Moon Lake Electric Ass’n, 45 F. Supp.
2d 1070, 1084 (D. Colo. 1999), vacated by Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. England, 2003 WL
179848 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Hill v. Norton, 275 F.3d 98, 103 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
247 Exec. Order No. 13186 § 3(a), 66 Fed. Reg. 3853 (Jan. 10, 2001). The Executive Order
also clarified that the MBTA applies to intentional and unintentional taking, and defined
“unintentional take” as that which “results from, but is not the purpose of, the activity
in question.” Id. § 2(c).
248 Id. § 3(c).
249 Id. § 3(e).
250 Id. § 4.
251 See generally Council for the Conservation of Migratory Birds, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE
SERV., http://www.fws.gov/migratorybirds/CCMB.htm (last updated Dec. 4, 2013).
252 Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States Dep’t of Defense & the
United States Fish & Wildlife Serv. to Promote the Conservation of Migratory Birds
(2006), available at http://www.fws.gov/migratorybirds/Partnerships/DoDMOUfinalSigna
ture.pdf.
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of Energy,253 Forest Service,254 Minerals Management Service,255 Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission,256 National Park Service,257 Bureau of
Land Management,258 National Marine Fisheries Service,259 and the Animal
and Plant Health Inspection Service.260
Information on the effectiveness of the MOUs in promoting the con-
servation of migratory bird populations has not been readily available.
However, the Council is preparing the first-ever report to provide infor-
mation on the progress of Council agencies implementing the Executive
Order. The Council will be developing subsequent reports on a three-year
cycle to more accurately track implementation of the Executive Order,
recognizing that bird conservation strategies require more than one year
253 Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States Dep’t of Energy & the
United States Fish & Wildlife Serv. Regarding Implementation of Exec. Order 13,186,
“Responsibilities of Federal Agencies to Protect Migratory Birds” (2013), available at http://
energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/10/f3/Final%20DOE-FWS%20Migratory%20Bird
%20MOU.pdf.
254 Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States Dep’t of Agric. Forest Serv.
& the United States Fish & Wildlife Serv. to Promote the Conservation of Migratory
Birds (2008), available at http://www.fws.gov/migratorybirds/Partnerships/MOU%20USFS
Final.pdf.
255 Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States Minerals Mgmt. Serv. &
the United States Fish & Wildlife Serv. Regarding Implementation of Exec. Order 13,186,
“Responsibilities of Federal Agencies to Protect Migratory Birds” (2009), available at
http://www.fws.gov/migratorybirds/Partnerships/MMS-FWS_MBTA _MOU_6-4-09.pdf.
256 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n & the
United States Dep’t of the Interior United States Fish & Wildlife Serv. Regarding Imple-
mentation of Exec. Order 13,186, “Responsibilities of Federal Agencies to Protect Migratory
Birds” (2011), available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/mou/mou-fws.pdf.
257 Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States Dep’t of the Interior Nat’l
Park Serv. & the United States Fish & Wildlife Serv. to Promote the Conservation of
Migratory Birds (2010), available at http://www.fws.gov/migratorybirds/Partnerships
/NPSEO13186Signed 4.12.10.pdf.
258 Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States Dep’t of the Interior
Bureau of Land Mgmt. & the United States Fish & Wildlife Serv. to Promote the
Conservation of Migratory Birds (2010), available at http://www.fws.gov/migratory
birds/Partnerships/BLM%20EO13186MOU.pdf.
259 Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States Dep’t of Commerce Nat’l
Marine Fisheries Serv. & the United States Dep’t of the Interior Fish & Wildlife Serv.
(2012), available at http://www.fws.gov/migratorybirds/Partnerships/NMFS MOU.pdf.
260 Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States Dep’t of Agric. Animal &
Plant Health Inspection Serv. & the United States Dep’t of the Interior Fish & Wildlife
Serv. (2012), available at http://www.fws.gov/migratorybirds/Partnerships/APHIS MOU
.pdf.
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to implement and measure progress.261 Perhaps more significant is the evo-
lution of the MOUs themselves, which according to one FWS biologist, “are
being developed to become more implementation based, giving [f]ederal
agencies a clear path to success for bird conservation while meeting their
stated mission.”262
2. Incidental Taking by Armed Forces
In the 2002 decision Center for Biological Diversity v. Pirie,263 a
District Court considered whether use by the Air Force and the Navy of
a small island in the Northern Mariana Islands as an “aircraft and ship
ordnance impact target area”264 for “live-fire target training”265 which in-
cidentally killed migratory birds violated the MBTA.266 The Navy had ap-
plied for a permit under the MBTA, 50 C.F.R. § 21.41, which authorizes
permits for depredation control but does not include taking incidental to
another activity.267 The permit request was denied, and the FWS advised
the Navy that “‘[t]here are no provisions for the Service to issue permits
authorizing UNINTENDED conduct on the part of a permittee.’”268 How-
ever, after initiation of the legal action, the FWS advised the Navy “that
it has long employed ‘enforcement discretion’ for activities that may be
prosecuted pursuant to the MBTA but are not covered by the MBTA per-
mitting regulations, that in this case it would ‘exercise its discretion not
to take enforcement action’ against the Navy and DOD.”269
After clarifying that Glickman was controlling regarding the
MBTA’s applicability to federal agencies, the Pirie court dismissed the
Navy’s argument that “the prosecution of unintentional killings of migra-
tory birds is a matter properly left to the prosecutorial discretion of the
FWS”270 as “simply defendants’ disagreement with the Glickman holding
in sheep’s clothing.”271 Addressing the defendant’s argument that the court
261 Interview with Dr. Eric Kershner, Wildlife Biologist, United States Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
Div. of Migratory Bird Mgmt. (Sept. 18, 2013) (on file with author).
262 Id. (Dr. Kershner identified the MOU with NOAA, supra note 259, as an example of
such an “implementation based” MOU).
263 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Pirie, 191 F. Supp. 2d 161 (D.D.C. 2002).
264 Id. at 165.
265 Id. at 168.
266 Id. at 165, 168, 176.
267 50 C.F.R. § 21.41 (2013).
268 Pirie, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 167 (emphasis in original).
269 Id. at 168.
270 Id. at 177.
271 Id.
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should defer to the FWS’s exercise of its prosecutorial discretion, the court
stated that whether the FWS may have in the past exercised its discretion
not to prosecute or permit unintentional violations of the MBTA is irrele-
vant because “[p]laintiffs have not sued the prosecutors, they have sued the
violators.”272 The Pirie court held that the Navy violated both the MBTA
and the APA.273
In December 2002, in response to the Pirie decision, a post-9/11
Congress enacted Section 315 of the 2003 National Defense Authorization
Act.274 This directed the Secretary of the Interior to exercise her authority
under Section 704(a) of the MBTA to promulgate regulations to exempt the
Armed Forces for any incidental taking of migratory birds during military-
readiness activities.275 The Final Rule was published in 2007,276 and it ex-
empts taking “incidental to military readiness activities”277 as that term
is defined in the Final Rule.278 The Final Rule only authorizes taking in-
cidental to “military readiness activity;” other takings by the military are
not exempted and are thus prohibited by the MBTA.279 If the activities may
“result in a significant adverse effect on a population of a migratory bird
species, the Armed Forces must confer and cooperate with the Service to
develop and implement appropriate conservation measures to minimize
272 Interestingly, the Pirie court stated that the FWS’ discretionary enforce-
ment of the MBTA is another reason for permitting private parties to
bring legal action, stating: [f]inally, if FWS exercises its discretion and
generally does not prosecute ‘unintentional’ violations of the MBTA,
when such activity clearly violates the law, this is even more reason for
plaintiff to proceed with its action here. FWS is on record in this case
stating that they will not prosecute defendants’ activities on [the target
range island]. Without plaintiff acting as a ‘private attorney general,’
no one would prevent these violations from occurring.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
273 Id. at 177–78.
274 Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. 107-314,
§ 315, 116 Stat. 2458, 2509–10 (2002).
275 Id. § 315(d).
276 Migratory Bird Permits; supra note 66; Take of Migratory Birds by the Armed Forces,
72 Fed. Reg. 8931-01 (2007) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 21.15 (2013)).
277 Id.
278 Migratory Bird Permits. supra note 66; Take of Migratory Birds by the Armed Forces,
72 Fed. Reg. at 8944 (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 21.3 (2013)). Authorization of take under this
rule applies to take of migratory birds incidental to “military readiness activity,” including
“all training and operations of the Armed Forces that relate to combat, and the adequate
and realistic testing of military equipment, vehicles, weapons, and sensors for proper
operation and suitability for combat use.” Id.
279 Id.
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or mitigate such significant adverse effects.”280 The Final Rule also directs
the Armed Forces to assess the effects of military readiness activities on
migratory birds in accordance with NEPA.281
Although the Department of Defense (“DOD”) has initiated coordi-
nation with other federal agencies to establish a “Coordinated Bird Moni-
toring Plan” as a step in the assessment of its compliance with the MBTA,
the MOU, and the Final Rule,282 the efficacy of the DOD’s effort to conserve
migratory birds is unclear.
III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
To reiterate the question posed by this Article, how can existing
law, policy, and practice be reshaped to provide for greater conservation
of protected avian species while accommodating anthropogenic activities
that kill birds but are a vital part of our modern industrial society? In this
final part, a number of possible legislative, judicial, and regulatory solu-
tions to that question are proposed, the last is the focus of this Article: A
broadly applicable program to permit incidental taking under the MBTA,
created by the Secretary’s exercise of her regulatory authority and imple-
mented by rules and guidelines created for those specific activities and in-
dustries that pose the most significant threats to protected avian species,
starting with the wind energy industry.
A. Legislative
The MBTA was last amended in 1998 when Congress removed
strict liability for baiting violations and added the requirement of a
knowing mens rea under Section 704(b).283 Although the likelihood of any
present-day Congressional action to amend the MBTA is remote given
the lack of bipartisan cooperation in general and specifically on environ-
mental issues, it is still a worthy exercise to consider what changes could
be made at the statutory level to address the issue of incidental taking.
Specifically, there are three possible legislative changes that merit con-
sideration and discussion.
280 50 C.F.R. § 21.15(a)(1) (2013).
281 Take of Migratory Birds by the Armed Forces, 72 Fed. Reg. at §§ 8943–8944.
282 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, COORDINATED BIRD
MONITORING: TECHNICAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MILITARY LANDS (U.S.G.S. Open File
Report 2010-1078) (2012) [hereinafter COORDINATED BIRD MONITORING], available at
http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2010/1078/pdf/ofr20101078.pdf.
283 16 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2012).
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First, Congress could “update” the statutory definition of “take” in
the MBTA. This amendment could be modeled on existing statutory and
regulatory definitions that include incidental taking and have been inter-
preted to exclude taking where the actual or proximate causation is too
attenuated.284 Because the definition would be applicable only to avian
species, it could be drafted to be both sufficiently broad to cover the range
of conduct necessary to protect any form of wildlife (e.g., “pursue, shoot,
shoot at, poison, wound, kill, capture, trap, collect, molest, or disturb”), and
at the same time adequately specific as to certain actions that are likely to
cause a taking of a protected bird (e.g., “nest abandonment”).285 This change
would resolve any remaining doubts on whether the MBTA’s prohibition
applies to incidental taking and underscore the broad protection and con-
servation intent of the MBTA.
Second, the current criminal penalties for incidental taking could
be replaced with civil penalties, which would resolve the due process con-
cerns about applying strict liability to criminal proceedings for incidental
taking, as well as concerns about the possibility of imprisonment and the
potential stigma from having a criminal conviction on a defendant’s record.
Civil penalties could include monetary fines, as well as injunctive relief
to cease the action or remedy the condition causing the taking, mitigate
past and future taking, and impose requirements to monitor and report
any future taking.
Third, if the MBTA is amended to provide for civil remedies, the
addition of a “citizens suit” provision should be considered to allow any
person to bring a civil action to enjoin an alleged violation of the MBTA
that results in an incidental taking and to compel enforcement of the taking
prohibition of the MBTA.286 This addition would address the need for a
“private attorney general” to prosecute “unintentional violations” under the
284 See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 687
(1995).
285 For example, the definition of “take” under the BGEPA is defined to mean “pursue,
shoot, shoot at, poison, wound, kill, capture, trap, collect, destroy, molest or disturb.” 16
U.S.C. §§ 668–668d (2012). “Disturb” is defined to mean:
To agitate or bother a bald or golden eagle to a degree that causes, or is
likely to cause, based on the best scientific information available, (1) injury
to an eagle, (2) a decrease in its productivity, by substantially interfering
with normal breeding, feeding, or sheltering behavior, or (3) nest aban-
donment, by substantially interfering with normal breeding, feeding,
or sheltering behavior.
50 C.F.R. § 22.3 (2009).
286 The ESA contains a broad citizen suit provision that could be used as a model for such
a provision in the MBTA. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2012).
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MBTA if the FWS fails to enforce the statute’s taking prohibitions.287 To
encourage citizen participation in the vigorous enforcement of the MBTA,
this amendment should include provisions for the award of attorneys’ fees
and costs to prevailing parties at the discretion of the court.288
The enactment of these statutory changes would address some of
the current difficulties in applying the MBTA to incidental taking. Further,
such statutory changes would also bring the scope, enforcement, and pen-
alty provisions of the MBTA into alignment with other major and more
“modern” federal wildlife laws.
B. Judicial
As discussed above, the opinion of a majority of courts and com-
mentators is that incidental taking is within the taking prohibition of
Section 703(a) of the MBTA subject to limitations of actual and proximate
causation.289 However, a few lower courts continue to limit the taking
prohibition based on Eighth and Ninth Circuit precedent.290 Obviously,
should a case come before the Supreme Court, a definitive ruling approv-
ing the Apollo Energies reasoning and holding would resolve any linger-
ing uncertainties on this issue.
In the meantime, hopefully other federal appellate and district
courts outside of the Tenth Circuit that have the opportunity to rule on
the incidental taking issue will adopt Apollo Energies’ foreseeability rea-
soning.291 Such rulings would reinforce the prevailing view and would also
bring the treatment of incidental taking under the MBTA nearer to other
major federal wildlife laws.
C. Regulatory
1. FWS’s Regulatory Authority to Permit Incidental Taking
Under the MBTA
The authors of the MBTA envisioned an important role for the
Secretary to implement the statute through regulations permitting taking
287 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Pirie, 191 F. Supp. 2d 161, 177 (D.D.C. 2002).
288 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4).
289 See infra Part I.B.3.
290 Id.
291 United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 689–90 (10th Cir. 2010).
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under certain circumstances as an exception to the broad prohibition of
Section 703.292 Section 704(a) provides:
Subject to the provisions and in order to carry out the
purposes of the conventions, referred to in section 703 of
this title, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized and
directed, from time to time, having due regard to the zones
of temperature and to the distribution, abundance, eco-
nomic value, breeding habits, and times and lines of migra-
tory flight of such birds, to determine when, to what extent,
if at all, and by what means, it is compatible with the terms
of the conventions to allow hunting, taking, capture, kill-
ing, possession, sale, purchase, shipment, transportation,
carriage, or export of any such bird, or any part, nest, or
egg thereof, and to adopt suitable regulations permitting
and governing the same, in accordance with such determi-
nations, which regulations shall become effective when ap-
proved by the President.293
Section 704(a) makes it clear that regulations also have the essen-
tial function of assuring compliance with the provisions of the Migratory
Bird Conventions.294 Additionally, regulations moderate the interpre-
tation of the broad taking prohibition of Section 703(a) as described by
Corcoran & Colbourn:
The MBTA in many ways acts as a skeleton upon which the
implementing regulations necessarily place the flesh. For
example, the MBTA initially sets forth a sweeping prohibi-
tion against taking, killing or possessing “at any time, by
any means or in any manner,” migratory birds, parts, nests,
eggs or products thereof. While it is seemingly overreaching
on its face, this prohibition was written in contemplation of
modifying its regulations.295
Finally, the regulations provide the FWS’s interpretation of the
MBTA’s statutory provisions. In the context of the MBTA and other fed-
eral wildlife laws, such agency interpretations have provided courts with
292 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2012) (“Unless and except as permitted by regulations made as
hereinafter provided in this subchapter . . . .”).
293 16 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
294 Id.
295 Corcoran & Colbourn, supra note 66, at 370.
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important guidelines in construing a statutory provision that is not clear
on its face,296 and are often accorded Chevron deference by the courts.297
As previously noted, the FWS has exercised its broad rule-making
authority by authorizing permits for taking from a diverse range of activ-
ities,298 and by specifying the scope and conditions for such permits, such
as record-keeping, reporting, compliance with applicable laws, and the
suspension or revocation of permits.299 Of particular interest are three in-
stances where this rule-making authority has been recognized by Congress,
the FWS, and the courts to permit incidental taking.
First, Congress recognized the Secretary’s authority to permit in-
cidental taking by the Armed Forces when it enacted the 2003 National
Defense Authorization Act.300 Section 315 of this Act specifically provides
that “the Secretary of the Interior shall exercise the authority of that
Secretary [under Section 704(a)] to prescribe regulations to exempt the
Armed Forces for incidental taking of migratory birds during military read-
iness activities.”301 This provision indicates that Congress did not find it
necessary to expand the authority of the Secretary to regulate incidental
taking by the Armed Forces. Further, the legislative history to this Act indi-
cates that the House of Representatives’ version of the legislation provided
for a statutory exemption for military readiness activities by the Armed
Forces.302 This provision was modified in conference with a compromise
agreement to use the Secretary’s regulatory authority to permit and miti-
gate the impact of such activities on migratory birds.303
Second, the FWS has recognized its own authority by issuing an
MBTA “special purpose permit” for incidental taking in several situa-
tions.304 First, the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) filed an
application for a special purpose permit “to take birds incidental to the
operations associated [with the shallow-set longline fishery based in
296 See, e.g., United States v. Boynton, 63 F.3d 337, 343–46 (4th Cir. 1995) (interpretation of
agency regulation to be harmonious with statutory provisions and providing a constitution-
ally adequate objective standard for enforcement); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys.
for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 703 (1995) (Regulatory interpretation of the term “harm” in
the ESA’s statutory definition of “take.” 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2013), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2012)).
297 Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 838 (1984).
298 50 C.F.R. §§ 21.21–21.41 (2013).
299 See Migratory Bird Permits, supra note 66.
300 Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. 107-314,
§ 315, 116 Stat. 2458, 2509–10 (2002).
301 Id.
302 148 CONG. REC. S10858-01, S10861 (Nov. 13, 2002) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin).
303 Id.
304 50 C.F.R. § 21.27 (2013).
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Hawaii].”305 According to the Final Environmental Assessment, the NMFS
sought a special purpose permit in connection with its management and
regulation activities under the Fishery Ecosystem Plan for Pacific Pelagic
Fisheries for the Western Pacific Region developed by the Western Pacific
Regional Fishery Management Council under the Magnuson-Stevens
Act.306 As stated in NMFS’s application, “[s]eabirds (as well as sea turtles
and other non-target species) can be killed or injured on either the set or
the haul when they are unintentionally hooked or entangled in fishing
gear. Injury and mortality meet the definition of ‘take’ for the purposes
of the MBTA.”307
Section 21.27 of the regulations provides the criteria for the issu-
ance of a special purpose permit:
Permits may be issued for special purpose activities re-
lated to migratory birds, their parts, nests, or eggs, which
are otherwise outside the scope of the standard form per-
mits of this part. A special purpose permit for migratory
bird related activities not otherwise provided for in this
part may be issued to an applicant who submits a written
application containing the general information and certifi-
cation required by Part 13 and makes a sufficient showing
of benefit to the migratory bird resource, important re-
search reasons, reasons of human concern for individual
birds, or other compelling justification.308
As stated in the Final Environmental Assessment, “[t]he nature of
the activity for which a permit is sought, the regulation of a commercial
fishery, may qualify only under the ‘other compelling justification’ of the
above permitting criteria[,]”309 and specifies the reasons why the applicant
cannot meet the other possible criteria.310 Noting that the term “compel-
ling justification” is not defined in the MBTA, implementing regulations,
or in current FWS policy or guidance, the Final Environmental Assessment
stated that the term will be applied by the FWS “on a case by case basis.”311
305 FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 230, § 1.2.
306 Id.
307 Id. (internal citation omitted).
308 50 C.F.R. § 21.27 (emphasis added).
309 FINAL WIND ENERGY GUIDELINES, supra note 39, at 5, § 1.4.
310 Id.
311 Id.
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The Final Environmental Assessment also stated that all of the informa-
tion contained in the application would be considered, including both the
environmental and economic impacts of the alternatives considered in the
Final Environmental Assessment.312
Although it is unclear from the Final Environmental Assessment’s
“compelling justification” for the permit,313 the FWS issued a Finding of No
Significant Impact and a special purpose permit to the NMFS.314 The FWS’s
action indicates that it is willing to exercise its existing regulatory author-
ity under the MBTA to issue a permit for incidental taking by a commercial
enterprise when it finds the environmental impacts are low, the economic
effects are not insignificant, and mitigation efforts are reducing the inci-
dental take of a protected species.
A second example of the FWS’s permitting of incidental taking
under Regulation Section 21.27 is found in its policy of issuing a special
purpose permit for the incidental taking of a migratory bird species that
is both protected under the MBTA and also listed under the ESA (other
than bald or golden eagles) if an Incidental Take Permit (“ITP”) has been
issued for such species under Section 10 of the ESA.315 In this situation,
it is reasonable to assume that the FWS is willing to issue the special pur-
pose permit based on the analysis and mitigation provisions found in the
312 Id.
313 After extensive review of the adverse and beneficial impacts of each alternative con-
sidering each of the issues listed in the Council on Environmental Quality regulation (40
C.F.R. § 1508.27(b) (2013)), and reaching the conclusion that none of the alternatives would
lead to significant impacts to the affected species during the three-year term of the permit,
the Final Environmental Assessment identified Alternative 2 (issuance of the requested
permit with conditions), “because it best meets the purpose and need for our permitting
action, would provide better information on seabird mortality and causes than under the
no-action alternative, and would have minimal operational impacts and no economic costs
to the fishery within the permit term.” FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 230,
at 43, § 5. See also U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FINAL ENVI-
RONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: ISSUANCE OF AN MBTA PERMIT TO THE NMFS AUTHORIZING
INCIDENTAL TAKE OF SEABIRDS IN THE HAWAII-BASED SHALLOW-SET LONGLINE FISHERY
[hereinafter QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: FINAL ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.fws
.gov/pacific/migratorybirds/pdf/NMFS Permit Final EA Q&A.pdf.
314 See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT (FONSI)—
ISSUANCE OF AN MBTA PERMIT TO THE NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE AUTHORIZING
TAKE OF SEABIRDS IN THE HAWAII-BASED SHALLOW-SET LONGLINE FISHERY (Aug. 16, 2012)
[hereinafter FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT (FONSI)—ISSUANCE OF AN MBTA PERMIT],
available at http://www.fws.gov/pacific/migratorybirds/pdf/NMFS Permit FONSI.pdf.
315 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING AND INCIDENTAL TAKE
PERMIT PROCESSING HANDBOOK 3-39 to 3-40 & Appendix A (1996) [hereinafter HABITAT
CONSERVATION PLANNING AND INCIDENTAL TAKE PERMIT PROCESSING HANDBOOK].
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Habitat Conservation Plan (“HCP”) that is required to issue an ITP, and
to promote the species and habitat conservation measures contained in the
HCP by removing the threat of a MBTA violation for an incidental taking
from the implementation of such measures.
Finally, federal courts have recognized that the FWS has broad
powers under the MBTA to promulgate regulations to minimize incidental
taking.316 For example, in National Rifle Ass’n of America v. Kleppe,317 the
district court upheld regulations requiring the use of steel shotgun shot
in certain hunting situations to limit taking of migratory waterfowl from
ingesting lead shot as based on the agency’s authority under Section 704
of the MBTA and within its discretion.318
2. Proposal for MBTA Incidental Take Permitting Program
by Regulation
As discussed above, the FWS has the regulatory authority to pro-
mulgate regulations to permit taking otherwise prohibited by the MBTA,
and has already exercised such authority by permitting incidental taking
by the Armed Forces and to issue special purpose permits for incidental
taking.319 Therefore, to solve the many problems created by using “volun-
tary guidance” and “prosecutorial discretion” as described above to ad-
dress the issue of incidental taking, this Article proposes that the FWS
promulgate a comprehensive regulation to create a program for permit-
ting incidental taking from industrial and commercial activities and from
infrastructure that create a significant threat to MBTA-protected species.
This Article further proposes that the FWS take the necessary
steps to promptly implement the MBTA incidental take permitting program
for wind energy development and operations by creating the necessary
rules and guidelines as described in the proposed regulation. This permit
program, once implemented, would replace the current method for “regu-
lating” wind energy activities based on voluntary adherence to guidelines
316 See RULEMAKING PETITION, supra note 197, at 71.
317 Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Kleppe, 425 F. Supp. 1101 (D.D.C. 1976), aff’d, Nat’l Rifle
Ass’n of Am. v. Andrus, 571 F.2d 674 (Table) (D.C. Cir. 1978).
318 Id. at 1110–11. See also United States v. Catlett, 747 F.2d 1102, 1105 n.5 (6th Cir.
1984) (“The Secretary was given plenary power to allow the taking of migratory birds,
which is otherwise wholly unlawful.”).
319 See Migratory Bird Permits, supra note 66; Take of Migratory Birds by the Armed
Forces, 72 Fed. Reg. 8931-01 (2007) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 21.15 (2013)); FINDING OF NO
SIGNIFICANT IMPACT (FONSI)—ISSUANCE OF AN MBTA PERMIT, supra note 314; HABITAT
CONSERVATION PLANNING AND INCIDENTAL TAKE PERMIT PROCESSING HANDBOOK, supra
note 315; COORDINATED BIRD MONITORING, supra note 282.
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by the developers and operators incentivized by the FWS’s practice of ex-
ercising prosecutorial discretion in the event an incidental taking occurs.
As described below, several different regimes are already in use to
permit incidental taking from industrial and commercial activities and in-
frastructure under different statutes. Therefore, before discussing the spe-
cific features and content of the proposals made in this Article, it would be
useful to examine briefly these existing regimes and assess their suitabil-
ity as a model for an incidental take permitting system under the MBTA.
a. Existing Incidental Take Permitting Regimes
1) MBTA Regulation § 21.27 Special Purpose Permits
First, it is possible that an incidental take permitting program could
be accomplished through the existing MBTA Regulation Section 21.27
authorizing “special purpose permits.”320 As discussed above, the FWS has
already exercised its authority under this regulation to issue a special
purpose permit for incidental taking by a commercial fishery.321 However,
it remains to be seen if the NMFS’s fishery permit satisfies the criteria set
forth in Regulation Section 21.27, specifically including the requirement
of a “compelling justification” for the permit.322 Further, the permit issued
in this situation was a “programmatic permit” to the NMFS, who is the
regulatory authority responsible for the development and enforcement of
regulations that specify procedures for the minimization and mitigation of
incidental taking, eliminating the need for the application and processing
of individual permits for each fishing operator.323
Using the special purpose permit regulation as a vehicle upon
which to base a broadly applicable program for permitting incidental tak-
ing by industrial and commercial activities, and by wind energy activities
in particular, has the advantage of being in place with the legal authority
to proceed immediately. However, existence of the regulation by itself is in-
adequate to create a comprehensive incidental take permitting program.
Its implementation would still require the creation of comprehensive new
(or coordination with existing) policies, regulations, and guidelines to im-
plement mitigation measures and other permit conditions necessary to
satisfy the conservation mandates of the MBTA and the migratory bird
320 50 C.F.R. § 21.27 (2013).
321 See FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT (FONSI)—ISSUANCE OF AN MBTA PERMIT,
supra note 314.
322 50 C.F.R. § 21.27 (2013).
323 See QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: FINAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 313.
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conventions, the regulatory requirements for a special purpose permit,
and the practical considerations of processing and enforcing such per-
mits. Therefore, the creation and implementation of industry-specific rules
and guidelines as proposed by this Article would still be necessary under
Regulation Section 21.27, and would be subject to NEPA and APA rule-
making procedures.324
Other requirements of Regulation Section 21.27 and how it has been
previously applied create additional issues. For example, the “compelling
reason” criteria for the fishery permit was based on an undefined case-
by-case subjective standard, which creates an ambiguity which on review
could be more difficult for the agency to defend than a permit issued under
a more precisely drafted regulation.325 Also, as discussed below, although
general “area” or “regional” permits are a possible option for permitting
incidental taking for certain activities, such a “permit-by-rule” approach is
not appropriate for all types of activities that threaten protected birds.326
Therefore, while using special purpose permits to permit incidental
taking under the MBTA is a credible alternative, its drawbacks argue for
more precisely tailored regulations and rules to address the specific issues
that would be presented by a broadly applicable permitting program.
2) ESA Section 10 Incidental Take Permits
Should the FWS decide to draft new regulations under the MBTA
to create a broadly applicable incidental take permitting program, it could
look for guidance at the ITP regime under Section 10(1)(a)(B) of the ESA.327
Section 10 is an attempt to balance the interests of endangered or threat-
ened species conservation and the reality that incidental taking of listed
species will occur from the conduct of commercial, farming, industrial, and
other activities by non-federal persons.328 The Section 10 ITP permitting
324 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012); 40 C.F.R. § 1508(B)(1) (2013).
325 See QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: FINAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 313.
326 See infra Part III.C.2.b(4).
327 16 U.S.C. § 1539(1)(a)(B) (2012) (“The Secretary may permit, under such terms and con-
ditions as he shall prescribe—[ ] any taking otherwise prohibited by section 1538(a)(1)(B)
of this title if such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an
otherwise lawful activity.”).
328 H.R. Rep. No. 97-567, at 31 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2831 (“[The ITP]
addresses the concerns of private landowners who are faced with having otherwise lawful
actions not requiring federal permits prevented by the section 9 prohibitions against
taking.”) An ITP is available to non-federal persons for incidental taking where the appli-
cant can satisfy the requirements of 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b) for endangered species, or § 17.32
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process has been recognized as an appropriate vehicle to resolve the po-
tential conflict between the two federal policies of protecting endangered
species and encouraging development of renewable energy resources.329
This balancing of interests in the case of listed bird and bat species
threatened by wind energy development is playing out as applications for
ITPs by wind energy developers are being processed.330 The major stum-
bling block for wind energy development to obtain an ITP is the require-
ment under Section 10 that an applicant must prepare an HCP describing,
among other items, how listed species are affected and mitigation measures
to address harm to such species.331 The development, studies, monitoring
and public comment components of an HCP can make it a time-consuming
and expensive process, often taking several years.332
How to apply the ESA to the rapidly developing wind energy in-
dustry, and possible changes that may be made to accommodate issues
raised by the wind energy industry, is the subject of a current ongoing
discussion.333 For example, to “streamline” the regulatory approval pro-
cess for wind energy projects, the DOI has introduced several initiatives
to facilitate the permitting processes for onshore and offshore wind energy
projects.334 The 2010 “Smart from the Start” initiative is intended to pro-
mote the development and permitting of wind projects off the Atlantic
coastline.335 Onshore, the collaborative development of “regional HCPs”
for threatened species. Federal agencies and other persons can obtain an “incidental take
statement” for incidental taking as part of the Section 7(a)(2) consultation process which
will occur whenever a federal agency, federal funding or a federal permit is involved. 16
U.S.C. §§ 1536(a)(2) & (b)(4).
329 RULEMAKING PETITION, supra note 197, at 84.
330 See, e.g., U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Approves Habitat Conservation Plan for Pro-
posed Ohio Wind Farm, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (July 18, 2013), available at http://
www.fws.gov/midwest/news/664.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm
_campaign=Feed%3A+FwsMidwestNewsroom+%28FWS+Midwest+News+and
+Highlights%29; U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., Issuance of an Incidental Take Permit to
Shell Wind Energy for Construction and Operation of the Bear River Ridge Wind Power
Project (Multiple Species Habitat Conservation Plan), Humboldt County, CA, 74 Fed. Reg.
68073-01 (Dec. 22, 2009); Chris Clarke, Another Endangered Species Kill Permit Issued to
Make Way for Wind Energy, REWIRE (July 22, 2013), http://www.kcet.org/news/rewire
/wind/another-endangered-species-kill-permit-for-wind-turbines.html.
331 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b) (2013).
332 See, e.g., Ruhl, supra note 50, at 1782.
333 Id.
334 Id. at 1783.
335 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Frequently Asked Questions: ‘Smart from the
Start’ Atlantic OCS Offshore Wind Initiative (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.doi.gov/news/press
releases/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=73317; Press Release, Bureau of
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(“RHCPs”) is intended to facilitate the issuance of ITPs for listed species
common to certain regions where wind energy development is particularly
active.336 However, the use of RHCPs to address the problems for wind
energy development created by the ESA are in a developmental stage with
significant legal and practical issues to be resolved.337
The suitability of Section 10 as a model for permitting incidental
taking under the MBTA in general, and by wind energy projects in partic-
ular, is questionable due to several key issues. The first issue is a systemic
one, which asks whether a system created to minimize and mitigate the
taking of a few specimens of relatively small populations of one or several
listed species is an appropriate model for permitting incidental taking of
greater numbers of larger populations of many species that are not in
danger of extinction or threatened with extinction. For example, further
study and analysis is necessary to determine if RHCP area permitting
would be an appropriate conservation approach for minimizing and miti-
gating taking of the greater number of MBTA-protected species, or for
larger local populations of a single species. A second issue arises out of the
apparent tension between implementation of the federal policy promot-
ing the rapid development of wind energy generation capacity338 and the
time-consuming requirements of the current ITP/HCP process.339 A third
related issue is the implementation and effect of the DOI’s initiatives to
“reduce the regulatory burden” involved in obtaining an ITP, which would
need to be resolved to see how the ITP program is applied to the wind en-
ergy industry.340 As with the RHCPs, it is an open question whether such
Safety & Envtl. Enforcement, BOEMRE Director Delivers Opening Remarks for Renewable
Energy Workshop (July 14, 2011), http://www.boem.gov/BOEM-newsroom/press-releases
/2011/press0714.aspx (Remarks of Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and
Enforcement Director Michael R. Bromwich to the Atlantic Wind Energy Workshop ex-
plaining the “Smart from the Start” wind energy initiative as it applies to offshore wind
energy development).
336 See, e.g., News Release, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Fish & Wildlife Serv. Evaluates
Landmark Wind Energy Corridor from Canada to Gulf of Mexico (July 13, 2011), avail-
able at http://www.fws.gov/southwest/es/Documents/FWSBiregionalwindenergyITPNR7
-11-11.pdf; WIND ENERGY WHOOPING CRANE ACTION GROUP, GREAT PLAINS WIND ENERGY
HCP FACT SHEET, available at http://www.greatplainswindhcp.org/documents/fact_sheet.pdf
(Regional HCP for a 1,500-mile-long, 200-mile-wide corridor from Texas to North Dakota,
covering parts of 9 states and 3 ESA-listed avian species (whooping crane, interior least
tern, and piping plover) and ESA-candidate avian species (lesser prairie-chicken)).
337 See Ruhl, supra note 50, at 1783–85.
338 See supra notes 45–48.
339 See Ruhl, supra note 50.
340 Id.
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“streamlining” initiatives are appropriate to conserve MBTA-protected
species and populations.
3) Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act Non-Purposeful
Take Permits
A third possible model for an MBTA permitting regime is the re-
cently implemented incidental take permit program under the BGEPA.341
Under this program, the Secretary is authorized to permit the taking of
eagles protected under the BGEPA upon a determination “. . . that [tak-
ing] is compatible with the preservation of the bald eagle or the golden
eagle . . . .”342 The requirements for a permit for the non-purposeful taking
of bald and golden eagles are described in Regulation Section 22.26,343 and
for the removal or relocation of bald and golden eagle nests in Regulation
Section 22.27.344
Guidance to assist applicants in determining whether an eagle take
permit is necessary and, if so, in meeting the regulatory requirements,
can be found in the “Eagle Conservation Plan Guidance” (“ECPG”).345 The
“eagle-specific” guidance provided by the ECPG is intended to integrate
341 50 C.F.R. §§ 22.26–22.27 (2013).
342 16 U.S.C. § 668a (2012). The definition of “take” under the BGEPA is defined to mean
“pursue, shoot, shoot at, poison, wound, kill, capture, trap, collect, destroy, molest or
disturb.” 50 C.F.R. § 22.3 (2013). “Disturb” is defined to mean:
To agitate or bother a bald or golden eagle to a degree that causes, or is
likely to cause, based on the best scientific information available, (1) in-
jury to an eagle, (2) a decrease in its productivity, by substantially inter-
fering with normal breeding, feeding, or sheltering behavior, or (3) nest
abandonment, by substantially interfering with normal breeding, feed-
ing, or sheltering behavior.
Id.
343 50 C.F.R. § 22.26 (2013). In addition to the preservation mandate set forth in 16 U.S.C.
§ 668a, the Regulations require that for the issuance of an incidental eagle take permit the
FWS must find that, “The direct and indirect effects of the take and required mitigation,
together with the cumulative effects of other permitted take and additional factors affect-
ing eagle populations, are compatible with the preservation of bald eagles and golden
eagles . . . .” Id.
344 50 C.F.R. § 22.27 (2013).
345 See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., MIGRATORY BIRDS: EAGLE CONSERVATION PLAN
GUIDANCE: MODULE 1—LAND-BASED WIND ENERGY, VERSION 2 (Apr. 2013), http://www
.fws.gov/migratorybirds/PDFs/Eagle Conservation Plan Guidance-Module 1.pdf [hereinafter
MIGRATORY BIRDS: EAGLE CONSERVATION PLAN GUIDANCE]. See also Bald Eagle Permit:
Non-Purposeful Take Application and Fee Schedule, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://
www.fws.gov/midwest/midwestbird/eaglepermits/baeatake/application.html (last updated
July 17, 2013) [hereinafter Bald Eagle Permit].
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with the more general guidance and the “tiered” approach set forth in the
Final Wind Energy Guidelines:
This document [ECPG] provides specific in-depth guidance
for conserving Bald and Golden eagles in the course of sit-
ing, constructing, and operating wind energy facilities. The
ECPG guidance supplements the Service’s Land-Based
Wind Energy Guidelines (WEG). WEG provides a broad
overview of wildlife considerations for siting and operating
wind energy facilities, but does not address the in-depth
guidance needed for the specific legal protections afforded
to bald and golden eagles. The ECPG fills this gap.346
The regulations authorize the FWS to issue permits for both isolated
takes and for “programmatic take,” which is defined as “take that is recur-
ring, not caused solely by indirect effects, and that occurs over the long
term or in a location or locations that cannot be specifically identified.”347
To qualify for a permit, an isolated taking must be a taking that “cannot
practicably be avoided,”348 and recurring taking must be “unavoidable” even
after the implementation of conservation measures including advanced
conservation practices (“ACPs”).349 The specific permit requirements and
conditions, including conservation measures and compensatory mitiga-
tion measures, may be described in an Eagle Conservation Plan (“ECP”),
346 MIGRATORY BIRDS: EAGLE CONSERVATION PLAN GUIDANCE, supra note 345, at ii.
347 50 C.F.R. § 22.3 (2013). See also MIGRATORY BIRDS: EAGLE CONSERVATION PLAN
GUIDANCE, supra note 345, at 36. Note that the ECPG’s definition of “programmatic” is
somewhat different than the term that is used by other authors and in this Article. See
infra Part III.C.2.b(4).
348 Bald Eagle Permit, supra note 345.
349 50 C.F.R. § 22.26(a) (2013). See also MIGRATORY BIRDS: EAGLE CONSERVATION PLAN
GUIDANCE, supra note 345, at 34. The ECPG provides that “advanced conservation practices”
(“ACPs”) are defined as “scientifically supportable measures that are approved by the
Service and represent the best available techniques to reduce eagle disturbance and on-
going mortalities to a level where remaining take is unavoidable. ACPs are a special subset
of conservation measures that must be implemented where they are applicable.” Id. at iv.
However, the ECPG also states, “[b]ecause the best information currently available indi-
cates there are no conservation measures that have been scientifically shown to reduce eagle
disturbance and blade-strike mortality at wind projects, the Service has not currently ap-
proved any ACPs for wind energy projects.” Id. The ECPG discusses working with developers
on implementing ACPs on an “experimental basis” and evaluated on their effectiveness, and
the possibility of using “other conservation measures” that should be applied as a condition
to a permit, but all such ACPs and other measures should be subject to a “cost cap” estab-
lished by the FWS and the developer. Id. Further, the implementation of any ACPs that
move beyond the “experimental” stage will not be required on a retroactive basis. Id. at v.
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a document produced by the developer or operator in coordination with the
FWS that supports the issuance of an eagle take permit, or demonstrates
that such a permit is unnecessary.350
As noted above, the ECPG is intended to coordinate with the recom-
mendations and methodology of the Final Wind Energy Guidelines. The
ECPG incorporates the “staged-tiered” approach of the Final Wind Energy
Guidelines for the siting, analysis, monitoring, operation and mitigation
of wind energy projects, and adds additional provisions and details to tailor
the risk assessment and decision-making process specifically to bald and
golden eagles.351 Like the Final Wind Energy Guidelines, adherence to the
methods and approaches “suggested” by the ECPG is not required to obtain
an eagle take permit.352 But unlike the Final Wind Energy Guidelines, the
ECPG does not provide assurances that adherence to the ECPG-suggested
methodology will be considered in a decision whether to prosecute an un-
permitted taking of a bald or golden eagle.353
The BGEPA incidental take permit program has both structural
and substantive features that should be considered when structuring an
MBTA incidental take permit program. For example, the eagle take per-
mit system is implemented by FWS regulations under specific statutory
authority, and further relies on FWS guidance that incorporates and builds
upon the existing Final Wind Energy Guidelines for implementation.354 In
addition, the eagle permit program provides for specific project permit ap-
plications and ECPs using species-specific and geographically specific pro-
visions for assessing risk and establishing take thresholds that satisfy the
conservation requirements of the statutory authority, provides for permits
for recurring taking, and provides for the use of compensatory mitigation
350 See MIGRATORY BIRDS: EAGLE CONSERVATION PLAN GUIDANCE, supra note 345. The ECP
is similar to, and may be a part of, the “Bird and Bat Conservation Strategies” (“BBCS,”
formerly called “Avian and Bat Protection Plans”) provided for in the Final Wind Energy
Guidelines, that “. . .will explain the analysis, studies, and reasoning that support pro-
gressing from one tier to the next in the tiered approach [and is] a document or compila-
tion of documents that describes the steps a developer could or has taken to apply these
Guidelines to mitigate for adverse impacts and address the post-construction monitoring
efforts the developer intends to undertake.” FINAL WIND ENERGY GUIDELINES, supra note
39, at 55. A BBCS may be reviewed by the FWS, but “[such review] is advisory only, and
does not constitute a federal agency action subject to [NEPA].” MIGRATORY BIRDS: EAGLE
CONSERVATION PLAN GUIDANCE, supra note 345, at 34.
351 MIGRATORY BIRDS: EAGLE CONSERVATION PLAN GUIDANCE, supra note 345. See FINAL
WIND ENERGY GUIDELINES, supra note 39, at 7–11.
352 MIGRATORY BIRDS: EAGLE CONSERVATION PLAN GUIDANCE, supra note 345, at iii.
353 See FINAL WIND ENERGY GUIDELINES, supra note 39, at 4.
354 See MIGRATORY BIRDS: EAGLE CONSERVATION PLAN GUIDANCE, supra note 345.
2013] DYING FOR A SOLUTION 61
measures to achieve a zero net-loss management policy.355 As discussed
below, a number of these provisions are incorporated in the proposed in-
cidental take permit program under the MBTA.
b. Components of Proposed MBTA Incidental Take Permit Program
As described in greater detail below, the proposed MBTA Incidental
Take Permit Regulation (“Proposed Regulation”)356 would create a program
for permitting incidental taking by a wide range of industrial and commer-
cial activities, including wind energy development and operations. To cre-
ate a broadly applicable solution, this proposal works within the structure
of the MBTA by having the implementing agency exercise its statutory
authority to promulgate a regulation to provide the basic framework for
permitting incidental taking, and to produce “step-down” implementation
plans and guidelines to provide the rules for permits to authorize take in-
cidental to a specific industrial or commercial activity or infrastructure,
such as developing and operating a wind energy project. The Proposed
Regulation would expressly provide that the issuance of such plans and
guidelines would be subject to the notice and comment and other proce-
dures applicable to administrative rule making procedures and to the
environmental review requirements of NEPA.
It should be noted that similar proposals have previously been
made, including the 2011 American Bird Conservancy’s petition for rule
making with the DOI (“ABC Petition”),357 a “permit-by-rule” proposal by
a pipeline industry trade organization,358 and by several commentators in
various academic journals.359 However, all of these proposals only apply to
incidental taking by wind energy or other specific industrial activity, and
do not propose a program that could be applicable to a broad range of indus-
trial and commercial activities and infrastructure. As such, this proposal
355 Id. at iv.
356 A “working title” for the regulation proposed in this Article.
357 RULEMAKING PETITION, supra note 197. The ABC Petition is the most comprehensive of
all the proposals, with substantial justification of the need and authority for an incidental
take program and a draft regulations to implement the proposal.
358 See AM. BIRD CONSERVANCY, BIRD-FRIENDLY BUILDING DESIGN (2011), available at
http://www.abcbirds.org/newsandreports/BirdFriendlyBuildingDesign.pdf.
359 See, e.g., Meredith Blaydes Lilley & Jeremy Firestone, Wind Power, Wildlife, and the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act: A Way Forward, 38 ENVTL. L. 1167, 1210 (Fall 2008); John
Arnold McKinsey, Regulating Avian Impacts Under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and Other
Laws: The Wind Industry Collides with One of Its Own, the Environmental Protection
Movement, 28 ENERGY L.J. 71, 91 (2007).
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is more comprehensive than any prior proposals or any existing permit
program under the MBTA or BGEPA.
Also, although this proposal focuses on developing a wholly new
incidental take permitting program, it incorporates elements from the spe-
cial purpose permit program under Regulation Section 21.27, ITPs under
Section 10 the ESA, the eagle take permit regime,360 and a variety of other
sources including the ABC Petition,361 various commentators’ proposals,362
and stakeholders’ policy statements.363
1) MBTA Incidental Take Permit Regulation
The proposed regulation for a MBTA incidental take permit pro-
gram should include the following basic provisions:
Defining “take.” The Proposed Regulation should add a new defini-
tion of “take” applicable to the MBTA, modeled upon the current defini-
tion in the BGEPA eagle permit regulations364 with additional language
modeled on the ESA definition365 of incidental taking: “Take means pursue,
shoot, shoot at, poison, wound, kill, capture, trap, collect, destroy, molest
or disturb, and includes any taking incidental to, and not the purpose of,
the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.”366
The Proposed Regulation should also add a definition of “disturb”
based on the BGEPA regulations to incorporate actions that cause avian-
specific types of harm that would result in a taking.367 The Proposed
Regulation’s definition of “take” should not significantly expand the scope
of prohibited taking beyond the Apollo Energies’ ruling, and would clarify
the nature and types of proscribed conduct under Section 703(a) of the
MBTA.368
360 See infra Part III.C.2.a(3).
361 RULEMAKING PETITION, supra note 197.
362 See infra Part III.C.2.a(3).
363 See American Bird Conservancy’s Policy Statement on Wind Energy and Bird-Smart
Wind Guidelines, AM. BIRD CONSERVANCY, http://www.abcbirds.org/abcprograms/policy
/collisions/wind_policy.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2013) [hereinafter Policy Statement on
Wind Energy and Bird-Smart Wind Guidelines].
364 50 C.F.R. § 22.3 (2013). See Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2012).
365 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2013).
366 50 C.F.R. § 22.3; 50 C.F.R. § 17.3.
367 50 C.F.R. § 22.3. It would be necessary in the Proposed Regulation to change references
to eagles in 50 C.F.R. § 10.13 to a member of a species protected under the [MBTA], and
modify the definition to be applicable to those actions that would affect a broader range
of species.
368 This new regulatory definition would only be applicable under the MBTA, and would not
supersede the more general definition found in 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (2013) for other purposes.
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Authority and Purpose. The Proposed Regulation should specify
that:
• The Secretary is exercising her regulatory authority
under MBTA Section 704(a) to issue permits for tak-
ing incidental to, and not the purpose of, otherwise
lawful activities when necessary to protect an inter-
est in a particular locality, or for the purpose of con-
serving the migratory bird resources of the United
States or the habitat upon which they depend, when
the Secretary determines that such taking is un-
avoidable through the implementation of rules and
guidelines established by the Secretary to mitigate
such taking.
• A permit issued under the Proposed Regulation
would be a Migratory Bird Treaty Act Incidental
Take Permit (“MBTAITP”).
• It is the purpose of the Proposed Regulation to au-
thorize both recurring and isolated taking, with the
specific requirements necessary to determine if a
taking is “unavoidable” in the rules and guidelines.
• It is the intent of the Proposed Regulation to autho-
rize both individual permits on a project-by-project
basis, and “general permits” for certain types of activ-
ities when deemed appropriate by the Secretary.369
Net-Zero Taking Policy. The Proposed Regulation should specify
that the Secretary has determined that the conservation standard required
by the MBTA to comply with the statute’s purpose and the Migratory Bird
Conventions is to maintain stable or increasing breeding populations of
MBTA-protected species, and to satisfy such standard the Secretary es-
tablishes a “net-zero taking policy” for taking under MBTAITPs on species-
by-species basis.370
369 See infra Part III.C.2.b(4).
370 See 16 U.S.C. § 701 (2012) (Duties and powers of the DOI include “the preservation,
distribution, introduction, and restoration of game birds and other wild birds.”); Fund for
Animals v. Williams, 246 F. Supp. 2d 27, 40 (D.D.C. 2003) (“[The U.S.-Canada Convention]
directs the parties to manage migratory bird populations to, inter alia, ensure a variety of
sustainable uses, sustain healthy populations for harvesting needs, and restore depleted
populations.”); Humane Soc’y of U.S. v. Watt, 551 F. Supp. 1310, 1319 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d,
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MBTAITP Criteria. The Proposed Regulation should specify criteria
for the issuance of a MBTAITP, which could be modeled on the criteria in-
cluded in the BGEPA eagle permit rule,371 including criteria that the permit
issuance is compatible with the preservation and conservation of MBTA-
protected species, that the taking is necessary to protect or promote a legit-
imate interest in a particular locality, and that the taking is incidental and
unavoidable even with implementation of the mitigation and other mea-
sures specified in the applicable rules and guidelines.372 The criteria should
also specify that a MBTAITP permit will not authorize the taking of any
species also protected under the ESA, the BGEPA or any other statute
unless also subject to a taking permit issued under such statute and, if so,
the MBTAITP will not authorize greater impacts from the taking than
allowed under such other permit.
MBTAITP Conditions and Fees. The Proposed Regulation should
specify that each MBTAITP will include conditions to issuance, renewal,
revocation, and termination of the permit as deemed advisable and neces-
sary by the Secretary—including the payment of all fees, the initial and
continued implementation of all mitigation, monitoring, management, and
reporting requirements imposed by the applicable rules and regulations.
A flat fee will be imposed on each applicant for each new permit applica-
tion and on permittee for each renewal application. Variable fees will be
imposed for the review, consultation, and processing of each new permit
application, for the ongoing periodic review, evaluation, and inspection of
a permittee’s studies, assessments, data, physical site, and facility to en-
sure continuing permit compliance, for the review, consultation, and pro-
cessing of a renewal permit application, and for the review, monitoring,
and inspection upon the decommissioning of a project. The variable fees
for the processing of applications for new permits, renewal of permits, and
decommissioning of a facility upon termination, expiration, or surrender
of a permit would be an amount based upon a calculation of size, impact,
and amount of agency resources necessary to process the permit or periodic
review, renewal, or decommissioning according to a formula to be detailed
in the rules and guidelines for each activity.373
713 F.2d 865 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“The treaty demonstrates an interest in preserving suffi-
cient numbers of birds to provide an ample stock of game for hunting in future years.”).
371 50 C.F.R. § 22.26(f) (2013).
372 Id. Also, the issuance of an MBTAITP would be a major federal action requiring NEPA
analysis. 50 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b)(4) (2013).
373 Fees based on the estimated cost to the agency to process incidental take permit appli-
cations, and to develop and monitor the effectiveness of the terms and conditions of the
permit, have already been proposed by the FWS for permits under the BEGPA eagle take
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Permit Duration. The Proposed Regulation should specify that all
MBTAITPs will be issued for a maximum period of five years, subject to
continuing compliance with all conditions imposed by the permit. A
MBTAITP would be renewable in five year increments up a maximum of
thirty years if the permittee is in compliance with all conditions specified
in the permit, as such conditions may be modified by any changes in the
Proposed Regulation or in the applicable rules and regulations since the
last issuance or renewal of the permit, which may include required up-
grades to mitigation standards, practices, procedures, and technology.374
Step-Down Rules and Guidelines. The Proposed Regulation should
provide that to fulfill its purpose and directive, the implementing agency
shall establish “Step-Down Rules and Guidelines” (“SDRG”) for activities
that the agency determines in its discretion to be “significant” threats to
migratory bird resources by causing or having the potential to cause sig-
nificant incidental taking of MBTA-protected species.375 All SDRGs should
permits regulations. 50 C.F.R. § 22.26; Eagle Permits: Changes in the Regulations Govern-
ing Eagle Permitting, 77 Fed. Reg. 22267 (Apr. 13, 2012). Similar fees based on the projected
cost to the agency of processing and monitoring MBTAITP applications and permits would
offset the costs of implementing and maintaining the MBTAITP program, which is a com-
mon objection to such a permitting regime. In addition to capturing the direct administra-
tion costs for the MBTAITP program, the fees would also capture some of the indirect
costs for agency resources that are currently not recouped under the Final Wind Energy
Guideline, such as for reviewing plans, consulting, and making recommendations to
developers to project developers.
374 The five-year maximum permit term is the same as specified in the BGEPA eagle take
permit regulations. 50 C.F.R. § 22.26(h) (2013). However, on April 13, 2012, the FWS pub-
lished a proposed change to the regulation, extending the maximum term of programmatic
take permits from five to thirty years for renewable energy and other projects designed
to operate for many decades. Eagle Permits: Changes in the Regulations Governing Eagle
Permitting, 77 Fed. Reg. 22267 (Apr. 13, 2012). The FWS stated, “[i]t has become evident
that the 5-year term limit imposed by the 2009 regulations . . . is not long enough to enable
many . . . project proponents to secure the funding, lease agreements, and other necessary
assurances to move forward with their projects.” Id.; Eagle Conservation, Research, and
Wind Energy, AM. WIND WILDLIFE INST. (2013), http://awwi.org/uploads/files/AWWI-Eagle
-Issue-Brief-%28June2013%29.pdf. This proposal has produced strong objections, for ex-
ample, that such long permits would make changes in mitigation next to impossible for
projects whose actual taking have exceeded projected levels. See AM. BIRD CONSERVANCY,
FWS-R9-MB-2011-0054, COMMENTS ON EAGLE PERMITS: CHANGES IN THE REGULATIONS
GOVERNING EAGLE PERMITTING (2012), available at http://www.abcbirds.org/abcprograms
/policy/collisions/pdf/CLC-ABC_EaglePermitDuration_Comments.pdf; Chris Clarke, Federal
Agency Slammed Over ‘Secretive’ Eagle–Wind Energy Policy, REWIRE (Feb. 19, 2013,
4:54 PM), http://www.kcet.org/news/rewire/wildlife/groups-slam-fish-and-wildlife-over
-undemocratic-eagle-policy.html.
375 See infra Part III.C.2.b(2).
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be based on best available scientific information, should incorporate best
management practices (“BMPs”) and best available technology (“BAT”)
standards for project design, development, mitigation, and monitoring, and
should include an adaptive management component.376
NEPA and APA. The Proposed Regulation should specify that the
SDRG are legislative rules subject to the notice and comment requirements
of APA Section 553,377 and that their adoption is a major federal action that
affects the quality of the human environment subject to the environmental
review requirements of NEPA Section 4332(2)(C).378
Enforcement Policy. The Proposed Regulation should include an
unambiguous statement that it is the DOI’s policy to prosecute any tak-
ing prohibited by MBTA Section 703 and applicable law including, but not
limited to, any incidental taking including an incidental taking by persons
conducting a lawful activity for which an MBTAITP is available under any
SDRG but who have not obtained an MBTAITP.379 The Proposed Regula-
tion should also state that incidental taking which violates the conditions
of a MBTAITP (such as incidental taking that exceeds permitted levels) will
be subject to prosecution, unless such violation is occurring notwithstand-
ing the full compliance and implementation of all other permit conditions
and applicable SDRG.
Transitional Rule. The Proposed Regulation should provide a two-
year “safe harbor” from prosecution for incidental taking under the MBTA
for currently operating and under-development wind energy projects that
are in compliance with the Final Wind Energy Guidelines and implement
all FWS recommendations regarding the development or operation of the
project.380 The safe harbor would be available until all required adminis-
trative law and environmental review processes for the SDRG for wind en-
ergy activities are complete and the SDRG is finalized. It is possible that
this transitional rule could be drafted to also apply to other activities that
have existing voluntary guidelines, such as for towers and antennas,381 in
376 Although not a part of this proposal, it is likely that inclusion of a “cost-benefit” or other
method of economic analysis will be advocated by industries and commercial activities that
will be subject to the cost of implementing BMPs and complying with BAT standards.
377 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). See Am. Mining Congress v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995
F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (agency “intent to exercise” legislative power delegated by
Congress as distinguishing between substantive and interpretive rules).
378 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b)(1) (2013).
379 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2012).
380 See FINAL WIND ENERGY GUIDELINES, supra note 39.
381 See, e.g., Service Guidance on the Siting, Construction, Operation and Decommissioning
of Communications Towers, supra note 175.
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contemplation of the MBTAITP program being available for such activities
in the future.
2) Step-Down Rules and Guidelines
Generally, so-called “step-down” plans describe specific strategies,
schedules, and criteria that follow in the “stepping down” from the broader
goals, objectives, directives, and provisions in an authorizing statute, regu-
lation, or other directive.382 Step-down plans often provide targeted proce-
dures, rules, and guidelines to implement their more specific strategies,
schedules, and criteria.383 New step-down plans or substantial changes to
existing plans typically require compliance with the environmental review
requirements of NEPA and other policies and an opportunity for public
review through the notice-and-comment procedures of the APA.384
As provided in the Proposed Regulation, a specific SDRG will be is-
sued for each industrial or commercial activity, or type of infrastructure,
that the implementing agency determines to be a “significant” threat by
causing or having the potential to cause significant incidental taking of
MBTA-protected species. This proposal calls for the first SDRG to be is-
sued under the Proposed Regulation and applied to the onshore wind en-
ergy industry because of the importance of promptly addressing incidental
taking from wind energy activities, and is used in this section as an exam-
ple of a SDRG that, with modifications, could be adapted to other indus-
trial activities.
This proposal contemplates that the Onshore Wind Energy Rules
and Guidelines (“Onshore Wind SDRG”) should incorporate and build upon
the Final Wind Energy Guidelines’ “tiered approach” for assessing impacts
on species and habitats, and the provisions relating to site evaluation,
single or multiple site characterization, field studies to document wildlife
and predict impacts, and post-construction studies to estimate impacts.385
However, to fully implement the MBTAITP program for the onshore wind
energy industry, the Onshore Wind SDRG would need to be more com-
prehensive, addressing issues of development, construction, operation,
management, monitoring, and decommissioning of wind energy projects
during all phases of the project’s life.386 Therefore, the proposed Onshore
382 See, e.g., GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, 2 PUB. NAT. RES. L. § 16:16
(2d ed. 2007) (describing the use of “step-down management plans” in the National Wildlife
Refuge System planning process).
383 Id.
384 Id.
385 See FINAL WIND ENERGY GUIDELINES, supra note 39, at vi–vii.
386 See Policy Statement on Wind Energy and Bird-Smart Wind Guidelines, supra note 363.
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Wind SDRG not only incorporates key elements from the Final Wind
Energy Guidelines, but also policies and provisions from the American Bird
Conservancy’s Bird-Smart Wind Guidelines,387 the American Wind Wildlife
Institute (“AWWI”),388 the Council on Environmental Quality Guidance on
the Appropriate Use of Mitigation and Monitoring,389 and other sources.
The proposed Onshore Wind SDRG should include the following
basic provisions:
Application and Scope. The Onshore Wind SDRG would apply to
land-based wind energy projects that seek to comply with the requirements
and criteria for an MBTAITP for isolated and/or recurring taking of one or
more MBTA-protected species.390 Compliance with the SDRG would be nec-
essary for, among other things, a determination by the FWS that any tak-
ing for which a MBTAITP is sought is “unavoidable,” one of the criteria for
the issuance of a permit.391
Net-Zero Taking Determination. The Onshore Wind SDRG should
provide that whether a permittee is in compliance with the net-zero tak-
ing policy established by the Proposed Regulation will be determined by
the FWS on a species-by-species, region-by-region, and population-by-
population basis, monitored and calculated over a reasonable period of
time to achieve an accurate average census of populations and levels of
actual taking.392
Permits. The Onshore Wind SDRG would provide guidance for the
issuance of a MBTAITP to cover all MBTA-protected species that are cus-
tomarily found in the project area, with specific levels of allowed taking
for individual species, or for groups of species with common characteristics
such that mitigation measures to minimize and avoid taking are common
to all species in the group. A MBTAITP will also include specific provisions
in an Avian Conservation Plan (discussed below) for the mitigation of tak-
ing through avoidance and minimization, use of best available technologies,
compensatory mitigation, and providing financial guarantees to fund the
mitigation and other permit conditions.
387 Id.
388 Building Mitigation Best Practices, AM. WIND WILDLIFE INST., http://www.awwi.org
/initiatives/mitigation.aspx (last visited Dec. 11, 2013).
389 Council on Environmental Quality, Final Guidance for Federal Departments and Agen-
cies on the Appropriate Use of Mitigation and Monitoring and Clarifying the Appropriate
Use of Mitigated Findings of No Significant Impact, 76 Fed. Reg. 3843 (Jan. 21, 2011).
390 See supra Part III.C.b(1); 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2012).
391 See supra Part III.C.b(1).
392 Id.; 16 U.S.C. § 701 (2012).
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Avian Conservation Plan. The Onshore Wind SDRG contemplates
the creation of an Avian Conservation Plan (“ACP”) for each project or
group of projects to be covered by a MBTAITP. The ACP would be devel-
oped incorporating the provisions and following the procedures of the
Onshore Wind SDRG and in consultation with the FWS. It would incor-
porate the provisions and measures necessary to mitigate direct, indirect,
and cumulative impacts, provide for compensatory mitigation as neces-
sary to achieve net-zero taking level, and would require final review and
approval by the FWS prior to or simultaneously with the issuance of the
MBTAITP. The ACP may include provisions or be incorporated into plans
relating to other avian or non-avian species protected by other federal or
state laws (such as an HCP for an ESA Section 10 ITP for a listed avian
species). An ACP could cover more than one project if all covered projects
are under common operational and financial control, and are in a region
with similar geography, landscape, vegetation, weather, wildlife, and other
features as to make a common ACP practical, applicable, conservation-
effective, and cost-efficient.
The ACP contemplated by this proposal fulfills a different purpose
than the Bird and Bat Conservation Strategy discussed in the Final Wind
Energy Guidelines, which is more a record of mitigation measures con-
sidered and rejected or applied by the developer, and not a wildlife con-
servation plan approved by the FWS and subject to NEPA procedures.393
Rather, the ACP should be more like an ECP developed under the ECPG
which states that “[the ECP] should provide detailed information on siting,
configuration, and operational alternatives that avoid and minimize eagle
take to the point any remaining take is unavoidable and, if required, miti-
gates that remaining take to meet the statutory preservation standard.”394
Like an ECP, an ACP will provide the basis for the FWS to develop a
MBTAITP for the applicant, or determine that the risk is too high to meet
the statutory and regulatory criteria for such a permit.395
Mitigation Through Avoidance and Minimization. Perhaps the
most important component of the Onshore Wind SDRG will be the guid-
ance and requirements for mitigation of adverse impacts from onshore wind
energy projects. In this discussion, mitigation has been separated into two
different sections: mitigation through avoidance and minimization dis-
cussed in this section, and compensatory mitigation which is discussed
in the section immediately following.396
393 See FINAL WIND ENERGY GUIDELINES, supra note 39, at 55.
394 MIGRATORY BIRDS: EAGLE CONSERVATION PLAN GUIDANCE, supra note 345, at 29.
395 Id. at 29–31.
396 See infra Part III.C.b(2).
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There is widespread consensus that the starting point for avoid-
ance and minimization is property siting of projects and “micro-siting” of
turbines within each project.397 The Final Wind Energy Guidelines provide
a solid basis for site evaluation and assessment upon which to develop the
minimization and avoidance provisions for the Onshore Wind SDRG.398
Generally, this is accomplished by establishing a tiered decision-making
framework for the preliminary site evaluation, site characterization, and
documentation of site wildlife and habitat to predict impacts, followed up
by post-construction monitoring to estimate actual impacts and to deter-
mine the need for other studies and research.399 At each tier, the Final
Wind Energy Guidelines provide decision points with criteria for deter-
mining whether to proceed to the next tier, what additional information
may be necessary before proceeding, what actions or combination of actions
are indicated as necessary, and whether the risk is determined to be un-
acceptable resulting in abandonment of the site.400 The tiered approach was
adopted in the ECPG401 and should also be incorporated in the Onshore
Wind SDRG.
In addition to the tiered approach for the proper siting of projects
and micro-siting of turbines, avoidance, and minimization mitigation can
be achieved through the specification and implementation of BMPs for
the siting, construction, operation, monitoring, and decommissioning of
wind energy facilities.402 The Final Wind Energy Guidelines include broad
overarching BMPs focused on avoidance and minimization in site con-
struction and operation, as well as retrofitting, and decommissioning,403
and the American Bird Conservancy’s Bird-Smart Wind Guidelines pro-
vide additional information on developing effective BMPs.404 For example,
pre-construction collision-risk modeling has been shown to be effective
in predicting collisions and is already widely used for project siting and
micro-siting of turbines within a project.405
397 FINAL WIND ENERGY GUIDELINES, supra note 39.
398 Id. at 12–48.
399 Id.
400 Id. at 7–8.
401 MIGRATORY BIRDS: EAGLE CONSERVATION PLAN GUIDANCE, supra note 345, at vi–ix.
402 See, e.g., Policy Statement on Wind Energy and Bird-Smart Wind Guidelines, supra
note 363.
403 FINAL WIND ENERGY GUIDELINES, supra note 39, at 49–52. See also MIGRATORY BIRDS:
EAGLE CONSERVATION PLAN GUIDANCE, supra note 345, at 78–79.
404 Policy Statement on Wind Energy and Bird-Smart Wind Guidelines, supra note 363.
405 See, e.g., Christopher Nations & Wallace Erickson, A Simulation Model for Assessing
Bird–Wind Turbine Collision Risk, WEST INC. (2003) , available at http://www.nationalwind
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However, the general BMPs provided in the Final Wind Energy
Guidelines406 can be significantly improved in a number of areas, specif-
ically including those applicable to operations and post-construction
mitigation. For example, the ECPG provides for BMPs and Advanced
Conservation Practices (“ACPs”)407 that may be implemented to include:
• Seasonal, daily, or midday shut-downs (particularly
relevant in situations where eagle strikes are sea-
sonal in nature and limited to a few turbines, or
occur at a particular time of day).408
• Turbine removal or relocation.409
• Adjustment of turbine cut-in speeds.410
• Use of automated detection devices (e.g., radar, ther-
mal infrared imaging, etc.) to control the operation
of turbines.411
After proper siting, “operational curtailment” BMPs (such as tur-
bine cut-in speeds) represent the best possible methods for improving miti-
gation through avoidance and minimization.412 Specifically, the continued
development and implementation of these BMPs have the potential to
avoid or minimize impacts by creating models based on species-specific
population densities, migration patterns, flight patterns, landscape fea-
tures, and other data to create cost-effective protocols for turbine shut-
downs or cut-in speeds to minimize collisions.413 Operational curtailment
has proved to be successful in reducing impacts on birds by curtailing oper-
ations during migration periods when unusual weather conditions changed
flight patterns,414 and for bats by reducing turbine operating hours during
.org/assets/research_meetings/Research_Meeting_VIII_Nations.pdf; Drewitt & Langston,
supra note 38, at 36.
406 Final Wind Energy Guidelines, supra note 39, at 49–52.






412 GEORGE C. LEDEC ET AL., GREENING THE WIND: ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL CONSID-
ERATIONS FOR WIND POWER 45 (2011).
413 See, e.g., id. at 52; Karamvir Singh, Development of a Cost Minimizing Strategy to
Mitigate Bird Mortalities in a Wind Farm (May 2012) (unpublished Master of Science
thesis, University of Massachusetts Amherst), available at http://scholarworks.umass.edu
/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1907&context=theses.
414 LEDEC ET AL., supra note 412, at 50–52.
72 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 38:1
low wind periods when bats were most active.415 Operational curtailment
does affect the economics of wind projects that may, in circumstances
where curtailments for wildlife mitigation and other purposes (including
“local congestion” from oversupply or distribution capacity, oversupply
of generating capacity and non-wildlife-related operational management)
will be substantial, make the development of certain projects economi-
cally unfeasible.416
Other technologies also hold promise for mitigation by avoidance
and minimization, including the use of marine and other types of radar,
thermal infrared imaging, acoustic detection, and night-vision observa-
tions.417 Improved detection technologies hold the promise of improving
avoidance and minimization by integrating real-time detection of bird
flocks or migrations with automated operational curtailment protocols and
deployment of deterrent technologies.418
Compensatory Mitigation. The term “compensatory mitigation” is
generally defined as “compensating for the impact by replacement or pro-
viding substitute resources or environments.”419 The Final Wind Energy
Guidelines further clarify the definition by dividing compensatory miti-
gation mechanisms into “in-kind” and “out-of-kind” as follows: “in-kind”
refers to the actual replacement of the resource lost with a substitute re-
source that is physically and biologically the same or closely approximate
to that which is lost, and “out-of-kind” refers to replacement with substi-
tute resources that are physically or biologically different.420 However,
compared to other environmental quality issues such as air pollution and
wetlands preservation, regulatory processes for mitigating wind-wildlife
impacts is in its infancy.421
415 See, e.g., EDWARD B. ARNETT ET AL., EFFECTIVENESS OF CHANGING WIND TURBINE CUT-IN
SPEED TO REDUCE BAT FATALITIES AT WIND FACILITIES: 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, BATS AND
WIND ENERGY COOPERATIVE (2009), available at http://www.batsandwind.org/pdf/Curtail
ment_2008_Final_Report.pdf; Press Release, Bats & Wind Energy Coop., Scientists Demon-
strate Solution to Reduce Bat Deaths at Wind Turbines (May 12, 2009), available at http://
www.batsandwind.org/pdf/BWEC%20Curtailment%20Press%20Release%205-12-09.pdf.
416 See Jonathan Cheszes, Impact of Curtailment on Wind Economics, RENEWABLE ENERGY
WORLD (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2012/03
/impact-of-curtailment-on-wind-economics.
417 LEDEC ET AL., supra note 412, at 43 (marine radar proven effective for detecting
approaching daytime bird flocks and nocturnally migrating birds); M. Desholm et al.,
Remote Techniques for Counting and Estimating the Number of Bird–Wind Turbine
Collisions at Sea: A Review, IBIS Vol. 148, Issue Supplement s1 76–89 (2006).
418 FINAL WIND ENERGY GUIDELINES, supra note 39, at 47.
419 40 C.F.R. § 1508.20(e) (2013).
420 FINAL WIND ENERGY GUIDELINES, supra note 39, at 54.
421 Building Mitigation Best Practices, supra note 388.
2013] DYING FOR A SOLUTION 73
Net-zero taking will require compensatory mitigation to offset the
direct and indirect effects of wind energy development by MBTAITP per-
mittees at both the project level and cumulative effects level.422 The “quan-
tity” of compensatory mitigation necessary to achieve a net-zero taking
under the MBTAITP program is likely be significant due to a large number
of permittees, a potentially high volume of takes by each permittee due
to the large number MBTA-protected species and populations, and from
potentially significant cumulative effects of multiple projects on regional
and ecosystem scales.423
Some projects may present unique prospects for “in-kind” compen-
satory mitigation, such as an opportunity to preserve or restore nearby
off-site replacement habitat to offset the indirect effects of habitat loss
or degradation from the project. However, it will also be necessary to have
other mitigation programs in which permittees can participate in addition
to project-specific in-kind mitigation opportunities. Establishing such pro-
grams would require taking the assessment and quantification of quantity
and types of impacts that require compensatory mitigation from projections
developed through the permitting process and adjusted from data acquired
through monitoring and adaptive management. Such assessment of im-
pacts would be used to determine the quantity and type of “mitigation
units” necessary to offset the anticipated and actual impacts. These units
could then be offset by participation in one or more compensatory mitiga-
tion programs available from a suite of such programs developed to imple-
ment conservation measures that will satisfactorily compensate for the
variety of impacts on MBTA-protected species.
One existing option for compensatory mitigation for habitat loss
or degradation, or for actual taking of protected species, is the establish-
ment of “species-specific” conservation or mitigation banks424 for MBTA-
protected species using guidelines established by the FWS regarding
conservation banking for listed and candidate species under the ESA,425
422 FINAL WIND ENERGY GUIDELINES, supra note 39, at 47.
423 Id. at 10.
424 See generally SOLANO PARTNERS, ENABLING PROGRESS: COMPENSATORY MITIGATION
SCENARIOS FOR WIND ENERGY PROJECTS IN THE U.S. 3–5 (Sept. 17, 2009), available at http://
www.awwi.org/uploads/files/AWWI Mitigation Report Enabling Progress.pdf; SPECIES
BANKING, http://us.speciesbanking.com/pages/dynamic/banks.landing_page.php?category
=banks (last visited Dec. 11, 2013).
425 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., GUIDANCE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT, USE AND OPERATION OF
CONSERVATION BANKS (May 2, 2003), available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library
/pdf/Conservation_Banking_Guidance.pdf. See Endangered Species: For Landowners—
Conservation Banking, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/endangered
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or mitigation banking modeled on the federal guidance for mitigation of
Clean Water Act Section 404 permits.426 Another option is establishing a
program for in-lieu payments to an authorized recipient, such as the FWS
or a state wildlife agency, for offsetting mitigation units.427 The proceeds
from issuance of the units could be used for the creation, expansion, or im-
provement of National Wildlife Refuges, or habitat acquisition or restora-
tion by state or non-governmental land conservation trusts or groups in the
region.428 Other possible beneficiaries of in-lieu programs could include
avian research programs and captive breeding and propagation programs
for MBTA-protected species of concern, such as the effort to establish two
additional breeding populations of whooping cranes called for under the
ESA recovery plan for the species.429
Monitoring and Adaptive Management. In the ECPG the FWS
stated, “The purpose of adaptive management is to improve long-term
management outcomes, by recognizing where key uncertainties impede
decision making, seeking to reduce those uncertainties over time, and ap-
plying that learning to subsequent decisions.”430
The ECPG went on to further explain the applicability of adaptive
management to the development of wind energy projects by stating,
In the context of wind energy development and eagle man-
agement under the ECPG, there are four specific sets of
decisions that will be approached through adaptive manage-
ment: (1) adaptive management of wind project operations;
(2) adaptive management of wind project siting and design
recommendations; (3) adaptive management of compensa-
tory mitigation; and (4) adaptive management of population-
level take thresholds.431
/landowners/conservation-banking.html (last updated Nov. 12, 2013); HABITAT CONSER-
VATION PLANNING AND INCIDENTAL TAKE PERMIT PROCESSING HANDBOOK, supra note 315,
at 3–21.
426 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS et al., Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use
and Operation of Mitigation Banks, 60 Fed. Reg. 58605-14 (Nov. 28, 1995).
427 See SOLANO PARTNERS, supra note 424.
428 See id. at 44.
429 See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., WHOOPING CRANE (GRUS AMERICANA) 5-YEAR REVIEW:
SUMMARY AND EVALUATION (Feb. 13, 2012), available at http://www.fws.gov/southwest/es
/Documents/R2ES/Whooping_Crane_5-yr_Review_Feb2012.pdf.
430 MIGRATORY BIRDS: EAGLE CONSERVATION PLAN GUIDANCE, supra note 345, at 28.
431 Id.
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The FWS also incorporated adaptive management principals into
the Final Wind Energy Guidelines, stating, “Comprehensively applying the
tiered approach embodies the adaptive management process.”432
The proposed Onshore Wind SDRG should include the principals
and techniques of adaptive management in all aspects of developing and
operating a wind energy project that is covered by the MBTAITP program.
This will require clear guidelines for the employment of adaptive manage-
ment to address the four sets of decisions specified in the ECPG, which also
supplies specific guidance on the implementation of adaptive management
that may used as a model for the Onshore Wind SDRG.433
In addition to the four decision sets identified in the ECPG, the
Onshore Wind SDRG should address the use of post-construction adap-
tive management to assess and modify avoidance and minimization miti-
gation through operational protocols, such as operational curtailment and
the deployment of new BAT. At least one proposal has been put forth to
develop a progressive tiered approach to operational mitigation to model
the costs associated with each higher tier, thereby reducing the financial
uncertainty of applying adaptive management to post-siting mitigation.434
Finally, it is important to emphasize that for adaptive management
to be effective, significant resources are required, not only on the part of the
permittee but also by the permitting agency. The agency will need adequate
resources for conducting in-depth review and verification of monitoring and
reporting by the permittee, and will need to work with the permittee to im-
plement improved mitigation techniques throughout the life of the project.
Without the commitment and availability of adequate agency resources, the
steady improvement in mitigation through the improvement and deploy-
ment of BMP and BAT is unlikely to occur.
“Best Available Technology” Standard. As described in the preceding
sections, many BMPs are technology-based which, for maximum effective-
ness, require deployment of the most developed version of the technology.435
Further, many of these technologies are steadily advancing, holding the
432 FINAL WIND ENERGY GUIDELINES, supra note 39, at 59 (defining “adaptive management”
as “[a]n iterative decision process that promotes flexible decision-making that can be ad-
justed in the face of uncertainties as outcomes from management actions and other events
become better understood”).
433 MIGRATORY BIRDS: EAGLE CONSERVATION PLAN GUIDANCE, supra note 345, at 44
(Appendix A: Adaptive Management).
434 ERIC KOSTER, A REAL WORLD APPROACH TO ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT FOR WIND ENERGY
PROJECTS (May 20, 2011), available at http://www.swca.com/images/uploads/A_Real_World
_Approach_to_Adaptive_Management_for_Wind_Energy_Projects.pdf.
435 Supra Part III.B.1.
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promise of increased mitigation through improved pre-construction sur-
veys, operations, detection and monitoring, and possibly alternative turbine
design.436 However, to capture the increased effectiveness, technologies
must be upgraded as they are improved or replaced with newer, more ef-
fective technologies.
Therefore, a key component of this proposal for a MBTAITP pro-
gram is inclusion of a BAT standard applicable to: (1) all new wind energy
projects; (2) all permit renewals and significant modifications or upgrades
for existing projects; and (3) when actual taking is exceeding levels speci-
fied in a MBTAITP. Technology standards have long been a part of pollu-
tion control programs,437 but they have not been widely incorporated into
wildlife conservation programs.
The inclusion of a BAT standard in the MBTAITP program would
require resolution of significant issues including determining the effective-
ness of available technologies, the economic costs that would be reason-
able to impose on owners and operators to meet such standards, and the
resulting benefits from specifying a BAT in a particular application or
circumstance.438 In spite of such implementation issues, making a BAT
standard part of the BMP mitigation component should result in improved
mitigation over the life of projects and provide incentives for the develop-
ment of improved technologies.439
3) Application to Other Activities that Cause Incidental Taking
The MBTAITP program proposed by this Article could be expanded
to incorporate other infrastructure, activities, and industries that are sig-
nificant causes of incidental taking of protected avian species, including
436 Although “triblade horizontal-axis” wind turbines have proven to be the most effective
turbine design available at this time, alternative wind turbine designs may have less
adverse impacts on protected avian species and be better suited in some applications. See,
e.g., Mike Barnard, What is the Most Efficient Design for a Wind Generator?, BARNARD ON
WIND (Feb. 22, 2013) http://barnardonwind.com/2013/02/22/what-is-the-most-efficient-design
-for-a-wind-generator/; David Ferris, Innovate: Look Ma, No Blades!, SIERRA, Mar./Apr.
2013, at 22, available at http://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/201303/innovate-wind-turbines/.
437 See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, The Regulation of Toxic Pollutants Under the Clean Water
Act, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10528, 10536–39 (1991).
438 See, e.g., Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009); ConocoPhillips Co.
v. EPA., 612 F.3d 822 (5th Cir. 2010) (interpretation of EPA rule under Clean Water Act
§ 316(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2012), requiring BAT for minimizing adverse environmental
impacts from offshore intake structures from the trapping and uptake of aquatic species).
439 Michael C. Dorf, Why the Supreme Court Decision Upholding Cost-Benefit Analysis
Under the Clean Water Act Should Not Be Used to Discredit Best-Practice Standards,
FINDLAW.COM, Apr. 6, 2009, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20090406.html.
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offshore wind energy projects, solar and other non-wind renewable energy
projects, oil and gas production, transportation and refining, and buildings.
The expansion of the program would be implemented through the creation
of comprehensive SDRG for the specific infrastructure, activity, or industry.
Future SDRG for other activities could also incorporate existing
FWS guidelines, such as those created for electrical transmission facili-
ties440 and for antennas and towers,441 in addition to provisions necessary
for MBTAITP applicants to satisfy the criteria required under the Proposed
Regulation and those specific to the infrastructure, activity, or industry.
These specific provisions could include long-term phase-in periods and
requirements for the retrofitting or upgrading of existing infrastructure,
such as building glass, to address the significant costs and practical issues
presented by large-scale threats created by thousands of individual pieces
of infrastructure.442
4) Alternative “Permit-by-Rule” Approach for Certain Activities
and Infrastructure
As used in this proposal, the term “programmatic permits” refers
to tools that set activity-based, project development impact thresholds, and
provide a streamlined permitting process for projects that fall within those
thresholds.443 Because the potential impacts of projects are identified in
advance through negotiations at the programmatic level, the need to repeat
the process at the project level is greatly reduced. This results in reduced
demands on both the permit applicant and the reviewing agency. These
“general permits” are designed to protect the environment while also facili-
tating implementation of projects that individually have “minor effects on
the environment,” and, “are most commonly used in the transportation and
infrastructure contexts.”444
This proposal for an MBTAITP program does not contemplate the
universal use of programmatic permits for several reasons. First of all,
many of the anthropogenic activities that present the greatest threats to
MBTA-protected species are “active” types of activities; that is, facilities and
projects where the potential hazard is created not only by the existence of
440 See AVIAN PROTECTION PLAN (APP) GUIDELINES, supra note 178.
441 See Service Guidance on the Siting, Construction, Operation and Decommissioning of
Communications Towers, supra note 175.
442 See AVIAN PROTECTION PLAN (APP) GUIDELINES, supra note 178.
443 See SOLANO PARTNERS, supra note 424, at Appendix 3-1.
444 Id.
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infrastructure but also by the activity itself, such as spinning wind turbine
blades. Many of the most effective mitigation measures for these types
of activities involve site-specific operational mitigation measures incorpo-
rating adaptive management principals that may not lend themselves to
broadly applicable BMPs. Second, given the diversity of protected species
under the MBTA and differences in each species’ population size, migra-
tion patterns, habitat requirements, activity patterns, and other charac-
teristics, a significant question exists whether impacts could be adequately
identified for such activities across a wide geographical range. General im-
pacts may lend themselves to a broad view, such as identification of “hot
spots” where due to migration and other patterns the siting of any projects
may not be indicated,445 but like individual siting and micro-siting analysis,
the specific impacts of each project will vary greatly.446 Further, given the
potential size of individual projects and their operational lifespan, it is un-
likely that any long-term adverse impacts on one or more MBTA-protected
species will be “minor.”
However, the programmatic or general permit approach does have
two possible applications in the development and implementation of an
MBTAITP program. First, if the Secretary is unable or unwilling to de-
velop a MBTAITP program as proposed above, an alternative would be to
develop a programmatic permit program to promote migratory bird conser-
vation through the imposition of broadly applicable BMPs for different
activities, industries, and infrastructure, for mitigation through avoidance
and minimization of take, and perhaps compensatory mitigation as well. At
least one industry association has proposed the development of program-
matic permits under the MBTA modeled on the “permit-by-rule” Corps
of Engineers’ Nationwide Dredge and Fill Program under Section 404 of
the Clean Water Act.447
Second, even if the MBTAITP program is put into effect as proposed
by this Article, by their nature some significant anthropogenic threats to
birds lend themselves to the application of the permit-by-rule approach.
Specifically, activities where the potential hazard is created by the exis-
tence of static infrastructure rather than an industrial activity may be an
appropriate use of the “general permit” approach.448
445 See Wind Development Bird Risk Map, AM. BIRD CONSERVANCY, http://www.abcbirds
.org/extra/windmap.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2013).
446 See RULEMAKING PETITION, supra note 197.
447 HOLLAND & HART LLC, F-2010-02, DEVELOPMENT OF A PERMIT PROGRAM FOR INCIDENTAL
TAKE OF MIGRATORY BIRDS 37–38 (2010), http://www.ingaa.org/Foundation/Foundation
-Reports/Studies/8099/11060.aspx.
448 See SOLANO PARTNERS, supra note 424.
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For example, once it is built, a multi-story office building does not
conduct an “activity” that threatens birds, but creates a hazard by its pres-
ence. The severity and potential impact of that hazard may be mitigated
in the siting, design parameters, and materials specifications, such as dis-
couraging development of certain structures in key avian hot spots, spec-
ifying building heights, bird-safe building glass or non-glass materials to
reduce collisions, and providing guidelines for lighting that does not confuse
nocturnally active birds.449
This example illustrates one situation where the “general permit”
approach to implementing the MBTAITP program to largely passive in-
frastructure types of “activity” has several advantages over the individual
permit approach described above. Specifically, the general permit approach
would be more easily applicable to a significant threat that is caused by a
large number of disbursed pieces of infrastructure, such as privately owned
multi-story buildings. Further, the general permit approach would create
less demand on both private and agency resources to implement, but would
still promote avian conservation by establishing “bird-friendly standards”450
for buildings and other types of infrastructure that are currently unregu-
lated at the national level if at all.451 Finally, given the highly disbursed
nature of structures and other infrastructure that may be suitable for this
approach, enforcement could be enhanced significantly with the creation
of a “citizen reporting hotline” or other mechanism where ordinary people
could report incidents of bird deaths and possible violations of the MBTA.
CONCLUSION
The intent of this proposal is to broaden the discussion of incidental
taking of MBTA-protected species from the problems created by the prose-
cution or non-prosecution of specific cases to a dialogue focused on finding
a widely applicable solution that builds upon the statute’s broad avian
conservation intent, its recognized prohibition of incidental taking, and the
Secretary’s authority to permit incidental taking when compatible with the
migratory bird conventions and the statute’s conservation standards. In
promoting this discussion, it would be constructive for all participants to
449 See generally AM. BIRD CONSERVANCY, Bird-Friendly Building Design (2011), available
at http://www.abcbirds.org/newsandreports/BirdFriendlyBuildingDesign.pdf.
450 Id. at 9.
451 Id. at 35. Federal legislation adopting bird-friendly standards for governmental buildings
has been proposed, and Minnesota, New York, and several cities have proposed or adopted
bird-friendly standards.
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recognize that it was not the primary intent of the migratory bird conven-
tions or the MBTA to outlaw the hunting of migratory birds, but to prevent
abuses that threatened the existence of healthy sustainable populations
of all protected species. As happened with the threat created by market-
driven and technology-assisted overhunting in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, through cooperation, comment, and compromise
a solution can be forged in the twenty-first century to address the modern
threats to birds posed by both rapidly expanding new technologies as well
as established activities and infrastructure.
For some time FWS has been administering the MBTA through the
issuance of non-regulatory guidelines created outside of the notice-and-
comment and environmental review processes, and incentivizing compli-
ance through prosecutorial discretion, all of which have led to the problems
discussed above. The era of “shadow regulations” should come to an end,
and be replaced with open and unimpeachable implementation processes
that build on the FWS’s knowledge and expertise in wildlife conservation
and management, as demonstrated in the BGEPA eagle take permit sys-
tem and the Final Wind Energy Guidelines. By having a clear regulatory
framework in which to do what it does best, the FWS can fulfill its mis-
sion as steward of the nation’s wildlife, and fulfill the conservation vision
of the MBTA and migratory bird conventions for another hundred years
and more.
